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"PLAIN ERROR" AND "FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS":
TOWARD A DEFINITION OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE
RULES OF PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Paul T. Wangerin*
Historically, criminal defense counsel have been required to
make timely procedural motions and contemporaneous objections to
trial or pretrial errors or lose forever the right to raise those er-
rors on appeal. In recent years, exceptions to this general rule
favoring finality of litigation have proliferated. Mr. Wangerin
suggests a theory underlying these previously undefined exceptions
and outlines a method for identifying errors that justify appellate
review despite procedural default.
Three general types of situations exist in which criminal defense counsel
fail to make timely procedural motions or contemporaneous objections to
errors during trials. These three situations involve ignorance, strategy deci-
sions, and "sandbagging." All three must be examined briefly.
Ignorance in this context needs little elucidation. Ignorance of a pro-
cedural rule that requires defense counsel to raise certain defenses before
trial1 may result, for example, in an objection or motion being made too late
to be effective. Or, during the trial itself, counsel may either fail to notice an
error made by opposing counsel or may be unaware of the ramifications of
the error. Consequently, counsel may fail to make a timely objection to the
error.
* Associate, Winston and Strawn, Chicago, Illinois. Former law clerk to the lonorable
Howard C. Ryan, Illinois Supreme Court. A.B., University of Missouri; J.D., John Marshall
Law School.
1. For example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 requires the alibi defense to be raised before trial.
See, e.g., United States v. Hutton, 558 F.2d 1265, 1266 (6th Cir. 1977) (no abuse of discretion
for trial judge to allow government to serve a demand for notice of alibi on the defense on
second day of three-day trial; even if allowing this belated notice was erroneous, it was harmless
error); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1977) (trial court abused discre-
tion in allowing undisclosed alibi rebuttal witnesses to testify; only "for good cause shown"
should undisclosed alibi rebuttal witnesses be allowed to testify); United States v. Smith, 524
F.2d 1288, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (alibi notice rule had not been complied with, so trial judge
was required to exclude alibi testimony other than that of defendant). FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2
requires the insanity defense to be similarly raised. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 412 F.
Supp. 871, 873 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (defendant ordered to submit to psychiatric interviews by
government's expert at earliest convenience so as to afford government opportunity to prepare
expert testimony of its own); United States v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by allowing prosecution to call as a witness a
psychiatrist who had interviewed defendant prior to trial at defense's request; defendant had
offered his own testimony on the insanity issue). See generally 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
12.1 to .2 (2d ed. 1979).
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Strategy decisions in this area of criminal practice involve completely dif-
ferent considerations. Defense' counsel often make carefully calculated deci-
sions not to object at trial or not to make a particular motion because they
perceive that the disadvantages of making such a motion or objection out-
weigh the advantages of making it. These decisions occur primarily in two
situations: when defense counsel seeks to avoid annoying the judge or jury
with minor, though sustainable, objections, and when counsel feels that the
benefits potentially arising from the other lawyer's errors are substantial.
Illustrative of this second type of decision is the frequent situation in which
counsel makes no objection to objectionable direct examination questions
because those questions will potentially open up fertile ground for cross-
examination.
Finally, "sandbagging" involves the deliberate attempt by defense counsel
to allow reversible error into a criminal trial as an insurance policy against an
adverse verdict. Sandbagging occurs most often in the context of jury in-
structions. One example of it suffices. Occasionally prosecutors inadvertently
omit from their requested instructions an instruction on an essential element
of a charged criminal offense or on a particularly important aspect of the
jury's responsibility. Defense counsel may be aware of this omission but may
consciously decide not to call the error to the attention of the court. Then, if
the jury convicts the defendant, that conviction will have been rendered in a
trial containing a serious and possibly reversible error. 2
Traditionally, rules requiring contemporaneous objections3 and timely mo-
An Illinois Supreme Court Rule, ILL. SUP. CT. R. 413(d), requires defense counsel to inform
the state of any defenses to be made at trial, particularly the alibi defense. See, e.g., People v.
Ramshaw, 75 I11. App. 3d 123, 125, 394 N.E.2d 21, 22 (5th Dist. 1979) (rule 413 does not apply
to misdemeanor cases; state's motion for disclosure denied because the unlawful sale of alcoholic
beverages is a misdemeanor); People v. Daniels, 75 I11. App. 3d 35, 41, 393 N.E.2d 668, 673
(1st Dist. 1979) (although rule 413 requires defense counsel to disclose names and addresses of
intended witnesses upon State's written motion, exclusion of an exculpatory witness revealed for
the first time on the last (lay of trial may be too harsh a sanction because the basic purpose of
trial is the determination of truth); People v. Fowler, 72 Ill. App. 3d 491, 497, 390 N.E.2d
1377, 1380-81 (4th Dist. 1979) (because the report of defendant's expert witness concerning
signature exemplars would be discoverable by the prosecution under rule 413, the report is not
the subject of the attorney-client privilege).
2. E.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1976) (defendant failed to make a
timely objection to the exclusion of blacks from the grand jury that indicted him; however,
conviction was upheld because defendant failed to show "cause" for his failure to challenge at
the appropriate time and actual prejudice); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973)
(defendant failed to make timely objection to the composition of the grand jury; conviction
affirmsed because no cause shown why waiver of objection should not apply under FED. R.
CruM. P. 12(b)(2)); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960) (defendant objected for the
first time on appeal that a search was not conducted in conformity with 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1958);
issue was considered on appeal and remanded).
3. FED. R. Cmv. P. 46; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 451. See generally 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
'riCE 46.01 to .02 (2d ed. 1979); 6 C. NICHOLS, ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE § 6182 (rev. ed.
1975); 4 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 640 (12th ed. 1976).
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tions 4 limited the likelihood that an appellate court would order a new trial
on the basis of unobjected trial errors. These rules prohibited defense coun-
sel from raising issues on appeal that had not been brought to the attention
of the trial court. Increased exceptions to the rules today, however, allow
appellate counsel to raise many issues for the first time on appeal.
Two factors have contributed to less stringent enforcement of rules requir-
ing contemporaneous objections and timely motions and to creation of
increasingly comprehensive exceptions to these rules. First, modern devel-
opments in legal specialization have led to the common circumstance of
different lawyers dealing with appeals than those dealing with actual trials.
Appellate counsel, of course, have substantial ability to notice trial errors
and have fiew misgivings about raising on appeal the errors and inadequacies
of trial counsel. (And, not surprisingly, errors and inadequacies emerge with
remarkable clarity from criminal trial records when those records can be
subjected to hours of careful post-trial scrutiny.) The second.factor contribut-
ing to the demise of procedural rules occurred simultaneously with the in-
creased participation of non-trial counsel in appeals. This factor arises from
the view that criminal defendants should not suffer because of errors of
counsel.
Because of those two factors, beginning in the early 1960's, the United
States Supreme Court and many state appellate courts began dismantling
procedural rules requiring timely motions and contemporaneous objections.5
The fact that errors were not called to trial judges' attention became increas-
ingly unimportant. In fact, it can be argued that appellate courts in that
period began moving toward a requirement of error-free trials. Together, the
two factors just discussed-non-trial counsel's appearance on appeal and less
rigid procedural rules-precipitated a flood of cases in the federal and state
appellate courts raising points and errors never considered by trial judges.
Because the appellate courts increasingly reviewed those errors, many de-
fendants obtained new trials. 6
Though the United States Supreme Court and the various state courts
increasingly reviewed trial errors despite noncompliance with traditional
procedural rules, these courts were notoriously reluctant to defin'e the ex-
ceptions to general procedural rules that justified review. Thus, although the
courts examined the errors, those courts could not say why some errors sur-
vived the failure to object and others did not. Widespread confusion re-
sulted.
This Article suggests an overall theory for defining the previously unde-
fined exceptions. A method will be outlined herein for determining what
errors justify appellate review and reversal despite procedural defaults. The
Article will show that two criteria must be met. First, the adversary system
itself must have broken down during the trial or pre-trial proceedings. Such
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (pretrial motions); id. 22 (time of motion to transfer); id. 47
(motions); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 114-1 to -12 (1977). See generally 8 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 12.01, .02, .04 (2d ed. 1979).
5. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text infra.
6. Id.
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breakdowns occur when the integrity of the judicial process has been im-
pugned by errors. Second, review and reversal will be shown to be neces-
sary only when evidence against criminal defendants is closely balanced.
Thus, review and reversal are appropriate only when defendants can estab-
lish two things: that certain types of errors occurred and that those errors
actually prejudiced the outcomes of the proceedings.
THE FINALITY RULE
Because an appeal is not a trial de novo, but rather a process for the
correction of errors, traditional rules of trial procedure require counsel to
make timely motions or contemporaneous objections to perceived errors in
order to preserve those errors for review. 7 These rules give trial judges the
first opportunity to consider their own rulings and to correct them, if neces-
sary, before the jury has withdrawn.8 New trials thus often can be avoided
despite trial errors.
A legitimate state interest in procedural finality supports these timely mo-
tions and contemporaneous objection rules. 9 Simply stated, the interest in
7. See Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1975); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 799
(1972); United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Springer,
460 F.2d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972); People v. Stark, 59 I11. App.
3d 676, 678, 375 N.E.2d 826, 827 (1978); People v. Dukett, 56 1ll.2d 432, 442, 308 N.E.2d 590,
596 (1974); People v. Neville, 42 111. App. 3d 9, 13, 355 N.E.2d 179, 182 (4th Dist. 1976).
FED. R. Civ. P. 46 provides:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but for all
purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a
party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known
to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the
action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to
object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does
not thereafter prejudice him.
Id. See also ILL. SuP. CT. R. 451; 5 ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3962 (Callaghan 1971).
8. "[Tihe purpose of the rule requiring objections is to prevent reversals and consequent
new trials because of errors the trial judge might well have corrected if the point had been
brought to his attention." Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970). See
also Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976); Browzin v. Catholic Univ., 527 F.2d 843
(D.C. Cir. 1975). See generally 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 46.01-02 (2d ed. 1979); 6
C. NICHOLS, ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE § 6182 (rev. ed. 1975); 4 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 640 (12th ed. 1976).
9. For the most recent articles dealing with procedural defaults, see note 11 infra.
Background material can be found in the following older articles: Campbell, Extent to Which
Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved (pts. 1-2), 7 Wis.
L. REV. 91 (1932), 8 WiS. L. REV. 147 (1933); Ladd, Objections, Motions, and Foundation
Testimony, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 543 (1958); Tate, Sua Sponte Consideration on Appeal, 9 TRIAL
JUDGES J. 68 (1970); Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L.
REV. 477 (1959); Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation,
Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1262 (1966) (hereinafter cited as
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finality allows appellate courts to conclude that the failure of criminal
defendants or defense counsel to follow established trial procedure for pre-
serving error forecloses the defendant from ever raising those errors on ap-
peal. Such failures to act constitute "procedural defaults," or "forfeitures" of
certain rights. This rule of law may be called the "finality rule."
Courts often state inaccurately that defendants who have failed to comply
with procedural rules for preserving errors have "waived" their rights to
raise the issues on appeal. 10 Such inaccurate terminology, though under-
standable, is not helpful. More precise definitions are needed. 11 In particu-
lar, "waiver" must be sharply distinguished from "forfeiture."
Failure to comply with procedural rules creates a forfeiture by procedural
default. Forfeiture acts by omission. It occurs eithe r inadvertently or inten-
tionally and, therefore, does not necessarily involve conscious decisions
made by criminal defendants. 12 Forfeiture acts by operation of the state
law of judgments. This is because the principle of forfeiture arises from the
need to balance defendants' interests in asserting certain rights against states'
interests in orderly proceedings and final judgments. In addition, forfeiture
Criminal Waiver]; Comment, Appeal of Errors in the Absence of Objection-Pennsylvania's
"Fundamental Error" Doctrine, 73 DICK. L. REV. 496 (1969); Comment, Waiver of Constitu-
tional Rights by Counsel in a Criminal Proceeding, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 93 (1967);
Comment, The Contemporaneous Objection Rule: Time for a Re-Examination, 67 Ky. L.J. 212
(1978); Comment, Basic and Fundamental Error: The Right Result for the -Wrong Reason, 43
TEMP. L.Q. 228 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Basic and Fundamental Error]; Note, Raising New
Issues on Appeal, 64 HARV. L. REV. 652 (1951).
10. This lack of accuracy is not limited to the courts. As a commentator has pointed out in
reference to FED. R. CRiM. P. 12(b)(2), "[t]he use of the term 'waiver' in the rule is an example
of the indiscriminate mixing of the concepts of procedural default and waiver." Spritzer, Crimi-
nal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 505 n.160
(1978). [hereinafter cited as Spritzer].
11. Much of the analysis in the following paragraphs of the text has been drawn from several
long and comprehensive articles on procedural defaults. No less than eight articles have ap-
peared on the subject of federal habeas corpus since 1977. The condensation of hundreds of
pages of research by these authors into a few paragraphs has been necessary to establish a base
for the study of the relationship between the Illinois cases and the United States Supreme
Court cases. See generally Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief For More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977); Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal
Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1050 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hill]; Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v.
Noia: Procedural Defaults by Reasonably Competent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenberg]; Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitutional
Rights: The Current Cost of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978); Soloff, Litigation
and Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 6
HOFSTRA L. Rv. 297 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Soloff]; Spritzer, supra note 10; Western,
Forfeiture by Guilty Plea-A Reply, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1308 (1978) [hereinafter cited as For-
feiture]; Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Away From Waiver].
12. "[T]he ordinary procedural default is born of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperi-
ence, or incompetence of trial counsel." Wainwright v. Sykes, 443 U.S. 72, 104 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 943,
997 (1965).
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arises from the judgment rule'that states may rely, at least to some extent,
on defendants' failures to assert their rights. 13
"Waiver," on the other hand, is an intentional relinquishment of a known
right or privilege. 14 Consequently, waiver must be viewed as a particular
and carefully limited type of forfeiture. Only defendants themselves can
waive rights, and then only if decisions to do so are made in a fully informed
manner. 15 In a sense, therefore, it can be said that waiver extinguishes a
right itself whereas forfeiture merely eliminates the method for asserting the
right. 16
A basic conflict facing courts as they have grappled with the need for
finality in the context of procedural defaults arises because those courts often
juxtapose two ideas. Obviously the state must be allowed to eliminate end-
less relitigation of criminal matters. Conversely, however, a fair system of
justice must be prepared to deal with situations in which criminal defendants
were convicted in trials with now obvious errors. The finality rule attempts
to deal with those competing concerns.
Many scholars and judges dismiss procedural rules of finality as an oppres-
sive fixation with the problems of crowded dockets and harassed trial judges.
These writers reason that fairness and justice to the individual defendant
must be the only consideration. 17 The point seems, at first glance, compel-
ling; however, a number of important factors, some theoretical and others
more practical, favor a certain degree of finality. 18
13. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. REV. 441, 454 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bator].
14. Schneckloth v. Bustanonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235, 237 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 475 (1965); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); United States v. Lujan-
Castro, 602 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Pressley, 602 F.2d 709, 711 (5th Cir. 1979).
See also Spritzer, supra note 10, at 474-75; Away From Waiver, supra note 11, at 1214 n.4.
15. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at
240; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399, 439 (1963); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 140-50
(1949); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942). See generally Criminal Waiver, supra
note 9.
16. Presumably some rights are too valuable to be waived. See Away Fromn Waiver, supra
note "11, at 1214.
17. See, e.g., Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Col-
lateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956). The author states:
[C]oncepts [of finality], like stare decisis, stem from the principle that in most mat-
ters it is more important that the applicable . . . role . . . be settled than that it be
settled right. But where personal liberty is involved, a democratic society employs a
different arithmetic and insists that it is less important to reach an unshakable
decision than to do justice.
Id. at 65.
18. Two prominent articles on the overall concept of finality conveniently take opposite
positions. One commentator, Bator, sets out the best argument favoring a goal of finality.
I . . . reason from the very real claims which the need for finality . . . make on the
criminal process, claims particularly strong in view of what I consider to be
philosophically faulty premises about justice which are often at the heart of the
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Perhaps the most important factor favoring finality involves the realization
that many legal philosophers have theorized that something other than the
search for individual fairness or justice produces the correct result in a given
case. 19 This theory suggests that correct results will be obtained by sys-
tematically implementing carefully considered rules and not by searching for
individual fairness. It is thought that the rules themselves produce a better
result than that which can be achieved by implementing individual judges'
notions of fairness. One commentator summarized the point:
If all decisions involving justice to individual parties were lined up on a
scale, with those governed by precise rules at the extreme left, those in-
volving unfettered discret'ion at the extreme right, and those based on
various mixes of rules, principles, standards, and discretion in the middle,
where on the scale might be the most serious and most frequent injus-
tice?... I think the greatest and the most frequent injustice occurs at the
discretion end of the scale, where rules and principles provide little or no
guidance, where emotions of deciding officers may affect what they do,
where political or other favoritism may influence decisions, and where the
imperfections of human nature are often reflected in the choices made. 20
The rule-oriented theory of law described above becomes particularly co-
gent in the context of the finality rule. The right of appellate courts to set
aside trial judges' rulings, even though trial counsel did not point out to trial
judges the errors of the rulings, places an extraordinary degree of authority
in appellate judges to search a dead record for individual fairness-a search
conducted, it must be noted, in the quiet sanctuary of law libraries and not
in the electric tension of trial courtrooms.
The rule of finality also has a number of practical values for society. Un-
questionably, abandonment of the finality rule decreases the public's respect
for the judicial system itself. In fact, perhaps the public's greatest and most
justifiable misgivings about the modern legal system have been generated by
a perception of endless litigation in which both defendants and courts resort
to mere technicalities. Another practical reason for the finality rule involves
demand that we repeat inquiry endlessly to make sure that no mistake has been
made.
Bator, supra note 13, at 525. Bator specifically argues that finality is essential if a system of
criminal law is to serve any educational or deterrent function or to encourage and support state
procedural reform.
Another commentator, Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1970), advances the strongest case against finality. Tigar argues
that the furtherance of the procedural protection of guaranteed rights must not be subordinated
to goals of deterrence, procedural finality, or pressures created by the criminal process itself.
See also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant: Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CI. L. REV. 142 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
19. Justice Holmes, commenting on the desire to achieve individual fairness, made the clas-
sic statement: "I hate justice!" R. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 184-85 (1976).
20. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at v (1976).
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the certainty of punishment for criminal defendants. Punishment, or the
threat thereof, must be viewed as swift and certain if it is to serve any
purpose whatsoever as an effective deterrent for potential criminals. Finally,
society itself must have a certain degree of repose. The finality rule, and its
elimination of relitigation, provides such repose.
The finality rule also serves the interests of the individual criminal de-
fendant. Abandonment of the rule actually increases trial error. Absent the
finality rule, judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel need not carefully
watch for errors during trials because errors can be corrected on appeal even
though not preserved for review. 21 More serious than the problem of inad-
vertence, however, is the likelihood that increased "sandbagging" will occur
at trials when the finality rule does not deter such conduct. 22 Sandbagging
invariably hurts criminal defendants more than it helps them. Finally, de-
creased use of the finality rule by appellate courts forces trial judges to par-
ticipate in trials as associate defense counsel in order to protect themselves
from reversal. Such participation often interferes with defense counsel's
well-considered strategy decisions.
Other factors support the statement that the finality rule may help in-
dividual defendants. Presumably, defendants wish to have their status
resolved as quickly as possible. (And even if they do not so wish, delay
cannot be considered a legitimate tactic.) Abandonment of the rule of finality
has greatly increased delay. Decreased reliance on rules of procedural de-
fault also has been a major factor contributing to the congestion of the
courts. Finally, whatever value punishment might have as a rehabilitative
mechanism for an individual defendant is lost when that defendant can main-
tain an endless hope that his or her conviction will be set aside.
Another benefit to the individual defendant provided by the finality rule
is, without question, the most important one. Abrogation of the finality rule
has generated a massive increase in the number of appeals that reach the
federal and state appellate courts raising issues not considered at trial. 23
Anyone even slightly familiar with state appellate criminal practice or federal
21. One could ask at this point whether the much-discussed issue of trial counsel's inade-
quacy, see Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179
(1975); Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L. REV. 811 (1976); Cover &
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1060-
64 (1977); Sines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures Jront
Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. Rev. 927 (1973), should be evaluated at least in part in connection
with the relaxation of technical rules.
22. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
23. In 1969, state prisoners filed 7,359 petitions for habeas corpus in federal district courts.
This represented a 100% increase over those filed in 1964. In addition, there was a 50% in-
crease in the number of petitions filed by federal prisoners challenging convictions or sentences.
1969 ANNOTATED REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 144. Furthermore, the figures for the third quarter of fiscal 1970
showed an increase of 19% over the same quarter of 1969. Id, fig. D. See generally Friendly,
supra note 18.
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habeas corpus will attest to the fact that the vast majority of criminal appeals
present no substantive legal questions. 24 In addition, in very few of these
appeals does any doubt exist about the defendant's guilt. 25 The problem
posed by the massive number of appeals and petitions thus becomes clear at
once. It is entirely possible that rare instances of a genuine injustice will
simply be overlooked because of the presence of so many trivial claims. 26
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FINALITY RULE
Although many strong arguments can be advanced favoring the finality
rule, no one argues that the rule should be applied without exceptions. An
early Supreme Court opinion, Hormel v. Helvering, 27 best presents the
rationale for the exceptions:
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of
justice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared
practice under which courts of review would invariably and under all cir-
cumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously
been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly
rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental
justice. 28
24. Such appeals are commonly referred to as "frivolous" appeals. "Compared to civil cases
criminal appeals present a larger percentage of such cases and issues. This statement is difficult
to support with statistics or firm evidence, but support is abundant in the opinions of judges
and lawyers who work regularly with criminal appeals." P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M.
ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 60 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CARRINGTON]. See also
Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 701 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Hermann].
25. See generally Hermann, supra note 24.
26. On the hopelessness and frivolity of many appeals, see CARRINGTON, supra note 24, at
90-96. See generally Hermann, supra note 24. "Anders' motions," often filed by appellate coun-
sel, and named for Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), have stemmed the tide of appeals
somewhat because these "Anders' motions" provide an otherwise unavailable opportunity for an
appointed defense attorney to withdraw from an appeal which appears to the appellate court to
be "wholly fiivolous." Id. at 744. Such motions do not, however, deal with two factors: (1) the
enthusiasm of appellate defense lawyers, particularly appointed counsel who need not consider
the cost of appeals normally borne by the accused; and (2) the fact that Anders' motions speak
primarily to legal issues involved in a case and do not evaluate the weight of evidence arrayed
against the defendant. This writer's experience as a clerk to a justice of the Illinois Supreme
Court has indicated the depth of both of these problems. Virtually all of the criminal appeals
presently reaching that court are brought by some branch of the Public Defender's Office.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court's concern for adequate representation of the indigent
on appeal has created the result that indigents are almost the only defendants who relentlessly
pursue appellate review. In addition, the lack of fiscal constraints on decisions to appeal has
generated a large increase in the number of cases ultimately disposed of by resort to a "harm-
less error" analysis. Finally, the actual weight of the evidence against the defendant, and the
concomitant likelihood or unlikelihood of conviction on re-trial, appears to play little part in the
decision by many criminal defendants to appeal convictions because of trial errors.
27. 312 U.S. 552 (1940).
28. Id. at 557.
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Unfortunately, though the rationale for the exceptions may be clear, the
specific exceptions are not so easily understood. This Article attempts to de-
fine an adequate rationale. But before a discussion of the exceptions them-
selves can be undertaken, two introductory points, one theoretical and one
historical, must be considered.
The- finality rule of procedural default evolved out of the adversary system
of justice, and must be considered, at least from a theoretical point of view,
a logical and inevitable element of that system. America's criminal law sys-
tem assumes that the clash of adversaries generates the correct result. Pri-
mary responsibility for the defendant's well-being thus rests on defense
counsel and not on the judge.
It is indisputable that the Warren Court's decisions requiring counsel in
all serious criminal cases 29 represent a tremendous increase in the protec-
tions afforded criminal defendants. Many of the commentators who support
those decisions do not acknowledge, however, that the presence of counsel
at trial requires consideration of the correlative finality rule. 30 It is quite
clear that the right to counsel and defendants' assertion of that right produce
the justification for the finality rule. The reasoning is straightforward. If the
obligation to control trials and to assert substantive rights rests on respective
adversaries, as it does in an adversary system, the blame for counsels' failure
to so act falls squarely on defendants. In short, acceptance of the right to
counsel necessitates acceptance of the finality rule and the binding nature of
procedural defaults.
Until the early 1960's, the federal courts readily accepted the rule that
failure to comply with state procedural finality rules barred defendants from
raising certain defenses in subsequent federal habeas corpus actions. 31 Ab-
29. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
30. See generally Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal
Case, 17 AM. CIM. L. REv. 233 (1979); Reeves, Right to Counsel in Louisiana (pts. 1-2), 25
LA. B.J. 303, 26 LA. B.J. 28 (1978); Comment, Criminal Law-Hybrid Representation-
Defendant's Constitutional Rights Were Not Violated by Denial of His Request to Act as His
Own Co-Counsel, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 230 (1978); Comment, Presence of Counsel in the Grand
Jury Room, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 1138 (1979); Comment, Constitutional Criminal
Procedure -The Standards for the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel,
14 LAND & WATER L. REv. 551 (1979); Comment, Pro Se Defendants and Advisory Counsel,
14 LAND & WATER L. REV. 227 (1979); Comment, Criminal Law: Effective Assistance of Kan-
sas Counsel, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 635 (1979); Comment, Criminal Procedure- Washington's
Standard for Determining Ineffectiveness of Counsel, 54 WASH. L. REv. 857 (1979); Note,
Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure-Where Suspect has not Waived His Right to an
Attorney's Assistance, Confession Prompted by Detectives Statements when Counsel was Ab-
sent is Inadmissible-Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 997
(1978); Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A
New Look after United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1979).
31. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); Daniels v. Allen, reported with Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,
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sent a"vital flaw" 3 2 or an "unusual circumstance- 33 the rule of procedural
finality controlled. Claims of both constitutional deprivations and mere trial
irregularities had to be raised according to state procedures. Thus, defend-
ants who failed to act on issues or errors in an appropriate and timely fashion
forever lost the right to raise those issues or errors. The federal courts called
this rule of "forfeiture" the "adequate state-ground" doctrine. 34
In 1963, in Fay v. Noia, 3 5 the Supreme Court abruptly changed the
adequate state-ground doctrine. In Fay, the Court found that failure to file a
timely appeal, clearly an adequate state ground for denial of review, did not
bar habeas corpus relief in the federal courts. The Court formulated a new
test in Fay: the prosecutor must establish that the defendant had committed
a "deliberate bypass" of the procedural issue in order to bar consideration of
the issue in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 36 Deliberate bypasses, of
course, involve conscious decisions, i.e. waivers. Thus, in effect, Fay's delib-
erate bypass standard substituted the rule of "waiver" for the rule of
"forfeiture" by default.
Numerous cases quickly followed Fay. In a notable case, Henry v. Missis-
sippi, 37 the Court applied a similarly relaxed procedural default standard to
a case that had come to it on direct appeal. 38 Thus, with Fay, Henry, and
similar cases, the Warren Court eviscerated the finality rule and thereby at
least implicitly suggested that nothing short of error-free criminal trials
would be acceptable.
The Warren Court's expansion of federal habeas corpus and direct relief
rights despite procedural defaults precipitated immediate and dramatic action by
state courts and legislatures. Most states quickly expanded state law excep-
tions to procedural default rules. That occurred either because of increased
296 U.S. 207 (1935); Smith v. Hixon, 249 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 967
(1958); Pearson v. Gray, 243 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 913 (1957); Dusseldorf v.
Teets, 209 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 969 (1954); United States v. Martin, 172
F.2d 519 (2d Cir.. 1949).
32. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 506.
33. Id. at 463. Brown established a test for determining the appropriate circumstances in
which a federal district court should exercise its discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing in a
habeas corpus proceeding. It held that such discretion should only be exercised where a "vital
flaw" occurred in the state procedure or where "unusual circumstances" were present. Id.
34. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1979); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-31 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 454-58 (1958); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 128; Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). An excellent starting point for study of the
"adequate state ground" doctrine is Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315 (1961). See also Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of.the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); Comment, Supreme Court Treatment of State Procedural
Grounds Relied on in State Courts to Preclude Decision of Federal Questions, 61 COLO. L.
REv. 255 (1961).
35. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
36. Id. at 438.
37. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
38. The issue in Henry involved a failure to make a contemporaneous objection.
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state sensitivity to federal due process rights or because of an understand-
able desire to avoid extensive federal court interference in state criminal
proceedings. By the mid-1970's, therefore, virtually every state recognized
extensive common law and statutory exceptions to the finality rule. 39
Perhaps by mere coincidence, but possibly by design, at about the same
time that the various states completed the process of providing new state
procedural default exceptions, the United States Supreme Court-now the
Burger Court-began moving away from its earlier denigration of the final-
ity rule. In a series of cases, the Court once again emphasized the value of
procedural requirements. 40 Cognizant of the fact that the dramatically in-
creased number of substantive defense rights afforded criminal defendants
necessitated a tool for the orderly presentation of those rights, the Court
turned back to the previously abandoned finality rule.
In 1977, the Court overruled Fay in Wainright v. Sykes.41 Under the
Wainright standard, the prosecutor need not show a deliberate bypass. Now,
the criminal defendant must show both a "cause" for his or her procedural
default and "prejudice" produced by it. This is the "cause and prejudice"
test, which has generated much comment. 42 Because the cause and prej-
udice test is quite stringent, criminal defendants must once again generally
rely on state law exceptions to procedural default rules, though these excep-
tions have been broadened substantially since the pre-Fay era.43
Undoubtedly, the alternating positions taken by the United States Su-
preme Court on the finality rule have dramatically influenced the Illinois
Supreme Court in its attempts to formulate a workable definition of Illinois
state procedural default exceptions. Unfortunately, however, the Illinois
court has decided the majority of its finality rule cases, even the most recent
ones, without reference to the federal cases. a Despite that lack of refer-
39. For a recent analysis of state procedural default laws and their relationship to federal
habeas corpus, see Comment, Protecting Fundamental Rights in State Courts: Fitting a State
Peg to a Federal Hole, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Protecting
Fundamental Rights].
40. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72" (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
41. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
42. See Hill, supra note 11; Rosenberg, supra note 11; Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and
Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work To Do, 31 STAN. L. REV,
1 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 215 (1977); Twenty-Third Annual
Survey of Developments in Virginia Law, 1977-1978, 64 VA. L. REV. 1348, 1426 (1978).
This test emerged and was developed originally in three earlier cases. See Francis v. Hen-
derson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233 (1973).
43. See generally Protecting Fundamental Rights, supra note 39.
44. See People v. Burns, 75 I11. 2d 282, 388 N.E.2d 394 (1979); People v. Precup, 73 I11. 2d
7, 382 N.E.2d 227 (1978); People v. Harris, 72 I11. 2d 16, 337 N.E.2d 28 (1978); People v.
Sullivan, 72 111. 2d 36, 377 N.E.2d 17 (1978); People v. Smith, 71 111. 2d 95, 374 N.E.2d 472
(1978); People v. Partin, 69 I11. 2d 80, 370 N.E.2d 545 (1977); People v. Marchian, 64 Il. 2d
257, 356 N.E.2d 71 (1976); People v. Rose, 43 I11. 2d 273, 253 N.E.2d 456 (1967); People v.
Hamby, 32 I11. 2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456 (1965). But see People v. Rehbein, 74 I11. 2d 435, 386
N.E.2d 39 (1978).
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ence to parallel federal cases, the Illinois cases provide a useful model for
examining procedural default rules and exceptions. Thus, this Article soon
turns to those cases.
One preliminary matter should be noted at this point. The overwhelm-
ing majority of cases decided in Illinois on the finality rule deny relief
to procedural defaulters a 5  A conservative estimate would indicate that
every case granting relief from the finality rule has been matched by perhaps
ten cases denying relief. 46 However, because of the disproportionate im-
pact of the few cases granting relief, and because of the confusion they have
produced, only these cases will be discussed in this article. An immediate
cautionary note must therefore be added. Many of the cases granting relief
cited herein have factual patterns virtually identical to uncited cases denying
relief. Thus, the cases discussed herein should not be read to suggest that
the courts would be bound to grant relief today on similar facts. Rather, the
cases discussed should be read only as a group, a group demonstrating that a
pattern emerges from all the cases.
ILLINOIS EXCEPTIONS TO THE FINALITY RULE
Illinois recognizes three basic exceptions to the finality rule. A common
law exception involves application of the retroactivity doctrine. 47 Two
statutory exceptions are "plain error"4 8 and relaxation of post-conviction res
judicata principles. .9 As these three Illinois exceptions are examined, they
should be compared carefully with the single federal habeas corpus excep-
tion to the finality rule-the cause and prejudice rule. 50
All three Illinois finality rule exceptions revolve around an elusive stan-
dard of "fundamental fairness." 51 Although this fundamental fairness stan-
dard is immediately appealing, conjuring up as it does images of the great
45. See, e.g., People v. Partin, 69 Ill. 2d 80, 83, 370 N.E.2d 545, 547 (1977); People v.
Barto, 63 Ill. 2d 17, 22, 344 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1976); People v. French, 46 I11. 2d 104, 107, 262
N.E.2d 901, 903-04 (1970); People v. James, 46 I11. 2d 71, 74, 263 N.E.2d 5, 6-7 (1970); People
v. Weaver, 45 I11. 2d 136, 138, 256 N.E.2d 816, 138-39 (1970); People v. Derengowski, 44 Ill.
2d 476, 479, 256 N.E.2d 455, 457-58 (1970); People v. Doherty, 36 I11. 2d 286, 291, 222 N.E.2d
501, 504 (1966).
46. Although no statistics are available on this point, a reading of the advance sheets for any
period would provide a representative sample of this ratio.
47. See notes 58-66 and accompanying text infra.
48. See notes 88-164 and accompanying text infra.
49. See notes 67-87 and accompanying text infra.
50. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
51. The Illinois position was expressed in People v. Hamby, 32 Ill. 2d 291, 205 N.E.2d
456 (1965): "We consider the waiver principle a salutary one .... but we have not hesitated
to relax its application where fundamental fairness so requires." Id. at 294, 205 N.E.2d at 4.
See, e.g., People v. Foster, 76 I1. 2d 365, 392 N.E.2d 6 (1979) (motion to suppress illegally
obtained evidence must be made in writing before trial unless fundamental fairness requires
otherwise); People v. Green, 74 II. 2d 444, 450, 386 N.E.2d 272, 275 (1979) (fundamental
fairness prevents waiver of objection to use of defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach trial
testimony).
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principles of American criminal law, the standard is nearly impossible to
define with any precision. 52 Only vague phrases such as "patently prejudi-
cial" 5 3 and "shocking to the conscience" 54  describe- the alliterative but ob-
tuse phrase. Infinite elasticity of definition thus seems to be the most perva-
sive trait of the standard. Courts and writers appear unable to explain what
fundamental fairness is; they only instinctively know what it is not. As a
result, at least in the area of the finality rule, fundamental fairness consists of
whatever a majority of an appellate court thinks it is in a specific case. 55
The lack of a concrete definition of fundamental fairness thus immediately
suggests the spectre of unbridled discretion discussed earlier. 56 Indeed, the
problem posed by judicial discretion in determining whether fundamental
fairness exists has been summarized with particular cogency by a student
commentator:
The approach now followed by the courts to determine the existence of
"basic and fundamental error" must not be continued. It creates more
problems than it solves, for it grants to the judge the discretion to apply
his own "criteria" without requiring him to follow precedent.... [S]uch an
approach must of necessity result in inconsistent decisions which penalize
the defendant solely for the acts of his counsel. This clearly is inimical to
our stated goals. The courts must not be permitted or required to decide
the severity of an alleged error by the severity of the crime, the publicity
52. Often, fundamental fairness is equated with an equally ambiguous term, due process.
For example, in In re D.M.D., 54 Wis. 2d 313, 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972), the court asserted that
due process is an exact synonym for fundamental fairness . (. " Id. at 318. A definition of
fundamental fairness may be sought, therefore, in a detailed description of due process. Due
process has been described as "a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in
the very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such govern-
ment...." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). Although the definition is nebu-
lous, due process has been given some contour by decisions holding certain practices to be
denials of due.process. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (improper comments
by prosecutor); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to present evi-
dence); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1970) (denial of rights to notice, counsel,
confrontation, and standard of proof); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (failure to appoint
effective trial counsel).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Pariente, 558 F.2d 1186, 1191 (5th Cir. 1977) (attempt to
impeach defendant on critical issue with statements not in evidence is patently prejudicial);
French v. City of Springfield, 5 I11. App. 3d 368, 379, 283 N.E.2d 18, 26 (4th Dist. 1972) (pros-
ecutor's patently prejudicial statements are those which, standing alone, require reversal).
54. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (pumping defendant's stomach
to obtain narcotics evidence was shocking to the conscience).
55. Justice Black criticized the equation of due process with fundamental fairness because he
thought a fundamental fairness test
depends entirely on the particular judge's idea of ethics and morals instead of re-
quiring him to depend on the boundaries fixed by the written words of the Con-
stitution. Nothing in the history of the phrase "due process of law" suggests that
constitutional controls are to depend on any particular judge's sense of values.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (Black, J., concurring).
56. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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involved, the possibility of conviction after a new trial, and the personality
of the persons involved. In order to restrict the courts to a consideration of
the severity of the error, and to concurrently eliminate the controlling
influence of subjective factors, there must be definite guidelines for the
court to follow. 57
An analysis of the Illinois cases discussed below, an analysis that focuses
on the facts of the cases in which relief was granted rather than on the
courts' language in the cases, should yield a workable definition of'funda-
mental fairness. That definition should lead, in turn, to an understanding of
the exceptions to the procedural default rules.
A. Retroactivity
Retroactivity is the principal common law exception to the finality rule.
Retroactivity is of concern in this Article because the unusual standard articu-
lated by the Supreme Court for determining the proper application of the
retroactivity doctrine is closely related to the "fundamental fairness" stan-
dard employed in procedural default cases. At common law, a decision that
overruled previously accepted law was given full retroactive effect; that is,
the overruling decision was applied to all similar cases regardless of whether
the controversies arose before or after the overruling decision and, obvi-
ously, regardless of whether the issue was raised at a particular earlier
trial. 5 The United States Supreme Court, however, has not applied all of
its criminal procedure decisions retroactively. 59  In Linkletter v. Walker,60
the Court held that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retroac-
tivity in criminal procedure cases. 6' Thus, to determine whether a decision
should be applied retroactively, the Court stated, a court should consider
the purpose, history, and effect of the new decision. 62 On this basis, the
57. Basic and Fundamental Error, supra note 9, at 233.
58. Currier, Time and Change in Judge Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv.
201, 205-06 (1965). The common law rule was grounded in the belief that courts do not create
law but merely apply it. Blackstone set forth the position of the common law jurist when he
declared that an overruled decision was not "bad law, . . . it was not law." I BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 68-71 (emphasis in original). On this basis, courts applied the overruling deci-
sions retroactively to ensure that all decisions conformed to the pre-existing law. Id. at 69-71.
For a discussion of the retroactivity doctrine in modern cases, see Ostreger, Retroactivity and
Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional Interpretations, 19 N.Y.U.L.F. 289 (1973); Note,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE. L.J. 907
(1962).
59. See notes 60-64 infra.
60. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
61. Id. at 640.
62. Id. Generally, the Linkletter criteria are promulgated as a three-factor test composed of
the purpose of the new rule, the reliance placed upon the previous rule by state officials, and
the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. See, e.g., Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (prospectively applying United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), which set forth the right to counsel at
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Linkletter court prospectively applied the exclusionary rule set forth in
Mapp v. Ohio.6 3
The Court recently summarized the retroactivity rule:
The teaching of these retroactivity cases is that if the law enforcement
officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized
was admissible at trial, the "imperative of judicial integrity" is not of-
fended by the introduction into evidence of the material even if decisions
subsequent to the search or seizure have broadened the exclusionary rule
to encompass evidence seized in that manner.64
As will be demonstrated below, the common law concept of the "imperative
of judicial integrity" also forms the theoretical basis for both Illinois statutory
exceptions to the finality rule. 65
Ironically, while courts have implemented the retroactivity doctrine quite
restrictively, they have, at the same time, expanded exceptions to the pro-
cedural default rules. 66 That discrepancy is illogical. Decisions applying
criminal procedure decisions retroactively produce the same result as deter-
minations that convictions will be set aside despite procedural defaults. In
both instances courts have forsaken procedural rules requiring issues to be
raised at certain times. The only practical difference between the two situa-
tions is this: in retroactivity cases, all criminal defendants in similar cir-
cumstances obtain relief, in procedural default exception cases, only indi-
vidual defendants benefit. In short, though fundamental fairness may dictate
that an individual defendant obtain relief, practical realities often requires
denial of exactly the same kind of relief to large and unknown groups of
defendants.
B. Post-Conviction Relief
The first of the two major statutory exceptions to the finality rule is
created by Illinois' post-conviction relief statute. The statute provides that
line-ups). See generally Note, Daniel v. Louisiana and the Doctrine of Nonretroactivity, 9 Sw.
U.L. REv. 801 (1977).
63. 367 U.S. 643 (1967). The Court's prospective application of exclusionary rule decisions
must be contrasted with the retroactive application of rules designed to ensure the accuracy of
criminal convictions. See, e.g., Ivan v. New York, 407 U.S. 203. 205 (1972) (retroactively
applied In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which held proof beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard applicable in all criminal cases). See generally Note, Retroactivity, 4 MEM. ST. U.L. REv.
521 (1974).
64. Unites States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1975). The common law concept of the
"imperative of judicial integrity" also forms the theoretical basis of both Illinois statutory excep-
tions to the finality rule. See notes 71-120 and accompanying text infra.
65. See notes 71-120 and accompanying text infra.
66. The relationship between retroactivity and procedural default exceptions is analyzed
briefly in Soloff, supra note 11, at 297; Away From Waiver, supra note 11, at 1245. See also
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POST CONVICTION REMEDIES
35-37 (Appr. Draft 1968). For an example of the relationship in action, see O'Connor v. Ohio,
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any imprisoned person who asserts that his or her constitutional rights were
substantially denied during the trial may have his or her claim heard in a
later proceeding. Any claim not raised in the original petition for subsequent
relief is, however, forever forfeited. 67 Illinois courts have consistently con-
strued this statutory provision to require application of the rule of procedural
defaults. 68 Issues not raised on direct appeal, either constitutional or non-
constitutional ones, are forfeited for the purpose of post-conviction proceed-
ings. 69 In addition, if issues could have been raised earlier but were not,
they are forever lost. 70
The Illinois Supreme Court most recently considered the forfeiture prin-
ciple in the context of post-conviction relief in People v. Partin. 71 In Par-
tin, the court applied the default rule, but suggested the existence of excep-
tions to the rule. The court stated that "those issues which could have been
raised but were not are considered waived [forfeited] . . . , unless funda-
mental fairness requirements dictate a relaxation of the waiver rule." 72 Un-
fortunately, the Illinois court in Partin, of course, failed to define fundamental
fairness.
The fundamental fairness exception to the finality rule in the context of
post-conviction relief can be understood, however, by examining cases in
which such relief was granted. Virtually all of these cases involve either er-
rors of defendants' counsel 73 or seriously improper conduct on the part of
judges or participating lawyers. 74 The remaining cases can be classified as
examples of the "identical defendant" problem. 75
385 U.S. 92 (1962) (ftilure to object to prosecutorial comment later held invalid in separate case
was not waived).
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 (1977).
68. See, e.g., People v. Hubbard, 50 111. 2d 134, 277 N.E.2d 863 (1971) (failure at trial to
raise issue of public defender's refusal to consider possibility of defendant's innocence is waiver
of issue in post-conviction proceedings); People v. LeMay, 44 III. 2d 58, 254 N.E.2d 476 (1969)
(constitutional claims not made in prior post-conviction petition held waived); People v. Houck,
50 I11. App. 3d 274, 365 N.E.2d 576 (1st. Dist. 1977) (specific evidentiary objections waive all
grounds not specified).
69. See, e.g., People v. Summers, 50 I11. App. 3d 33, 365 N.E.2d 241 (4th Dist. 1977) (rule
of waiver bars consideration in post-conviction proceeding of matters that could have been ar-
gued on appeal); People v, Doherty, 36 Il1. 2d 286, 222 N.E.2d 501 (1967) (issues that could
have been presented on appeal held waived).
70. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 39 Ill. 2d 286, 235 N.E.2d 570 (1968) (issues once raised in
post-conviction hearing cannot be raised again); People v. Evans, 37 Ill. 2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 778
(1967) (defects and irregularities waived by guilty plea may not be raised in post-conviction
proceeding). A complete discussion of the waiver issue appears in 5 ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE § 39.62 (Callaghan 1971).
71. 69 I11. 2d 80, 370 N.E.2d 545 (1977).
72. Id. at 83, 370 N.E.2d at 547.
73. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text infra.
74. See notes 80-84 and accompanying text infra.
75. See text atcornpanying note 85 infra.
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Defective counsel cases generally involve either incompetent counsel or
the defendants' pro se appearance at some stage in the proceedings. 76 In
People v. Hamby, 77 a leading case, the court explained:
We consider the waiver principle a salutary one, conducive to the effective
enforcement of the rules which society has established for its protection,
but we have not hesitated to relax its application where fundamental fair-
ness so requires .... Defendant here sought to raise on the original writ
of error the claims presented in the amended post-conviction petition. His
counsel, apparently considering some of them without merit or unavailable
on the record then before the court, did not do so. Defendant then sought
leave to proceed pro se, which was denied. Defendant, having been de-
nied leave to proceed pro se and secure review of the questions which he
now seeks to raise, cannot fairly be said to have waived such questions. 78
The remainder of the defective counsel cases involve defendants who could
not afford attorneys. 79
The second group of cases containing exceptions to procedural default
rules in the post-conviction relief context involve seriously improper conduct
by judges or participating lawyers. People v. Evans80 is the principal case of
this group. In Evans, the defendant alleged that the trial judge improperly
admonished him of the consequences of his guilty plea and sentenced him to
a jail term exceeding the statutory maximum. Trial counsel had not objected
to these points."' The court found Evans' claim to be a substantial allega-
tion of a constitutional violation. Consequently, the court required an answer
from the state and an evidentiary hearing. 82 (Although only a few improper
conduct cases appear in the context of the fundamental fairness exception to
76. People v. Goerger, 52 111. 2d 403, 288 N.E.2d 416 (1972) (matters that could have been
raised on appeal reviewed in post-conviction hearing because defendant had proceeded without
counsel); People v. Nicholls, 51 I11. 2d 244, 281 N.E.2d 873 (1972) (since first petition was
dismissed without providing requested counsel, matter was not res judicata); People v.
Raymond, 42 II1. 2d 564, 248 N.E.2d 663 (1969) (inadequate representation of defendant by
appointed counsel precluded operation of dismissal as res judicata); People v. Polansky, 39 Ill.
2d 84, 233 N.E.2d 374 (1968) (failure to invoke appellate procedures was not a default when
right to counsel had been denied); People v. Kleagle, 37 Ill. 2d 96, 224 N.E.2d 834 (1967)
(double jeopardy claim required exception to res judicata rule).
77. 32 111. 2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456 (1965).
78. Id. at 294, 205 N.E.2d 458. Hamby is frequently cited, incorrectly it is suggested, in
cases not involving pro se issues.
79. See, e.g., People v. La Franca, 4 I11. 2d 261, 122 N.E.2d 583 (1954) (where failure to
appeal resulted from defendant's indigence, appealable issues will not be deemed waived in
post-conviction hearings); People v. Joyce, 1 I11. 2d 225, 115 N.E.2d 262 (1953) (where indi-
gence prevented direct appeal, defendant may still argue in post-conviction hearing that confes-
sion was obtained through physical abuse); People v. Jennings, 411 I11. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824
(1954) (constitutional claims not raised on appeal are waived in post-conviction proceedings un-
less indigence prevented appeal).
80. 37 II1. 2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 778 (1967).
81. Id. at 31, 224 N.E.2d at 781.
82. Id.
[Vol. 29:753
1980] "PLAIN ERROR" & "FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS" 771
Illinois' interpretation of its post-conviction relief statute, 83 as will be noted
below improper conduct cases appear with great frequency in the context of
the "plain error" exception. 84)
The "identical defendants" problem need be mentioned only briefly. The
problem occurs when two defendants are tried for the same crime, are both
convicted, and one then obtains a reversal on appeal by raising a certain
issue. The other defendant,, if he or she has procedurally defaulted, is appar-
ently precluded from raising the same issue. Under these circumstances,
however, Illinois courts have determined that fundamental fairness requires
that the procedural default be set aside. 85 Common sense dictates that re-
suit.
The foregoing analysis indicates that defects in counsel-either pro se ap-
pearances, incompetence, or improper conduct-serve as the basic tools for
avoiding the res judicata effect of Illinois' interpretation of its post-conviction
relief statute. 86 Clearly, however, the facts of the cases define the excep-
tions, and not the vague invocation of fundamental fairness language.
In the vast majority of cases, the factual situations, like those outlined
above, indicate that the adversary system of justice itself has broken
down. 87 That breakdown constitutes justification for an exception to the
finality' rule. Trials must proceed as balanced procedures for dealing with
adversary positions. If trials become circuses, or if lawyers fail to serve as
adversaries, juries will not be able to decide guilt or innocence properly.
Thus, in such situations, the actual integrity of the judicial process has itself
been implicated.
C. Plain Error
"Plain error" constitutes the second Illinois statutory. exception to the fi-
nality rule for procedural defaults. Unlike the res judicata rule of Illinois'
post-conviction relief statute, 88 which is comparable to federal habeas corpus
83. E.g., People v. Rose, 43 I11. 2d 273, 253 N.E.2d 456 (1967).
84. See notes 108-115 and accompanying text infra.
85. E.g., People v. Burns, 75 I11. 2d 282, 388 N.E.2d 394 (1979).
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 122-1 to -7 (1977). For a general discussion of the effect of
incompetent counsel, see generally, Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial
Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1980): Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assist-
ance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 752 (1980).
87. The phrase "breakdown in the adversary system" is taken from the Advisory Committee
Note accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 103(d) (plain error). See generally 10 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.01 [3.-4]-(d) (1979). Recently, the United States Supreme Court
employed similar language in a case in which a defendant sought to raise on collateral attack a
point he had not advanced on direct appeal. The Court refused to consider the point because it
concluded that the defect was not "'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a miscar-
riage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure."
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 428 (1962)).
88. See notes 67-87 and accompanying text supra.
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law only by analogy, 89 plain error concepts and definitions pervade both
Illinois 90 and federal law. 9 1 Illinois codifies the concept in two statutes:
Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substan-
tial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of
the trial court. 92
Instructions in criminal cases shall be tendered, settled and given in ac-
cordance with section 67 of the Civil Practice Act, but substantial defects
are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interests
of justice require. 93
The subject of plain error can be best understood by initially analyzing the
United States Supreme Court's attempts to formulate a definition for the
term. According to the Court, plain errors are errors of such a grievous
nature that a new trial or other relief must be granted even though the
defendant did not object to the trial judge's action at the appropriate
time. 9 4  In United States v. Atkinson 95 the Court stated: "In exceptional
circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public
interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has
been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 96  Although
during the Warren Court years the Court gradually expanded the plain error
standard, 9 7 the Burger Court has returned to the rigid approach set out
89. See generally R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 156-59 (2d ed. 1969); Note, The
Unpredictable Writ-The Evolution of Habeas Corpus, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313 (1977).
90. See notes 92 & 93 and accompanying text infra.
91. Federal procedural rules provide that plain errors affecting substantial rights may be
noticed even though they were not called to the trial court's attention. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 (b);
FED. R. EVID. 103(d); Sup. Ct. R. 40 (1)(d)(2). Additionally, FED. R. Civ. P. 61 (harmless error)
has been interpreted as including a plain error standard in civil cases. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2883 (1973).
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 615(a) (1977).
93. Id. § 45 1(c) (plain errors referred to as "substantial defects").
94. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241 (1969). Virtually all relevant Supreme Court cases
are contained in Annot., 42 L. Ed. 2(d 946, § 17 (1976). See generally 8B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE §§ 52.01-03 (1979); 6 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES §§ 52.1-.62 (1967); 3 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 851-856 (1973).
95. 297 U.S. 157 (1936).
96. Id. at 160. An earlier case phrased the rule with equal rigidity: "[A]lthough this question
was not properly raised, yet if a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to
defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it." Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632,
658 (1896).
97. The plain error rule initially was restricted to errors occurring at trial; the Warren Court
expanded the rule to include non-trial errors as well. See, e.g., Bartone v. United States, 375
U.S. 52 (1963) (probation revocation and enlargement of sentence); Sibler v. United States, 370
U.S. 717 (1962) (faulty indictment).
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above.98 This rigidity is consistent, of course, with the Burger Court's res-
urrection of the finality rule in habeas corpus cases.99
Unfortunately, however, despite both the Warren and Burger Courts' de-
scriptions of plain error, the term has not been adequately defined. To better
understand plain error, therefore, Illinois plain error cases may be
examined. An analysis of Illinois cases involving plain error reveals recurring
fact patterns in decisions that grant plain error relief. Most' 00 of the cases
involve, not surprisingly, defects in counsel' 0 1 or seriously improper con-
duct. 102
People v. Nowak 10 3 is a typical plain error case involving a defect in coun-
sel. 104 The court in Nowak stated that the forfeiture rule was inapplicable if
the trial court clearly permits the prosecutor to take advantage of a poorly
represented defendant. 105 Nowak and its companion defective counsel
cases, 106 suggest that a demonstration of ineffective counsel virtually guaran-
tees plain error relief. 107
98. In Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 510-11 (1963), the Court determined that An error
at voir dire was outside the plain error rule because the pretrial error was not subsequently
raised at trial. In a separate opinion, Justice Powell concluded that plain error constituted "in-
excusable procedural default." Id. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Hart, Foreword: The
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 118 (1959)).
99. See notes 31-43 and accompanying text supra.
100. The qualification 'most" reflects the Illinois court's inconsistent application of the plain
error rule. Some cases simply were reasoned incorrectly. See notes 116-128 and accompanying
text infra. In other instances, the rule was involved even though plain error had nothing to do
with the court's decision to review the particular issues involved. See notes 121-134 infra.
101. See notes 103-107 infra.
102. See notes 108-115 infra.
103. 372 I11. 381, 24 N.E.2d 50 (1939).
104. One defendant in Nowak was accused of rape, but maintained that he was innocent. The
court summarized his defense attorney's failures:
In disregard of Nowak's steadfast denial of guilt and of his plea of not guilty, his
counsel stipulated the People's case against [Nowak] and cut [him] off from any
benefit of diligent cross-examination of the prosecutrix, her husband and the officer.
He failed to protest against the ruling out of competent testimony and failed to
assist his client by questions designed to bring out fully the facts and circumstances
surrounding the alleged crime, when the defendants were on the stand.
Id. at 385, 24 N.E.2d at 52.
105. Id. at 382, 24 N.E.2d at 50.
106. See, e.g., People v. Gardiner, 303 I11. 204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922) (prosecutor took unfair
advantage of inexperienced defense counsel); People v. Schulman, 299 Ill. 125, 135 N.E. 530
(1921) (defense counsel's ignorance deprived accused of important impeachment evidence).
107. Professor Wright has argued that the original basis of the plain error rule, or at least the
concept of plain error, was the need to protect indigent defendants from the errors of appointed
counsel. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5043 (1977).
This seems incorrect. Courts allowed procedural default exceptions long before the onset of
frequent representation by appointed counsel. See articles cited in note 9 supra. Recently,
Pennsylvania adopted a system whereby procedural defaults are analyzed in the context of in-
competence of counsel. Only if the default implicates the lawyer's ability beyond a satisfactory
degree will the default be ignored. Comment, Pennsylvania Waiver Doctrine in Criminal Pro-
ceedings: Its Application and Relationship to the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim, 15
DUQ. L. REV. 217 (1976).
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Plain error cases in the second group, those involving seriously improper
conduct, fall into two categories-severely prejudicial summations by pros-
ecutors 10 8 and improper judicial conduct. 109 The overwhelming majority of
improper conduct cases involve summations. In People v. Fort, 110 the court
quoted the prosecutor's rather colorful closing argument and concluded that
failure to object to it had not forfeited the issue for the defendant."' The
prosecutor had argued:
That man is a rapist now. He was a rapist before and he will always be a
rapist. I ask you ladies and gentlemen, who could have a bigger interest in
this particular case than this defendant's wife. She's got two children to
support. She will move heaven and earth to get him home to support
A recent case, however, suggests that the mere allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel
will not always afford an exception to the procedural default rule. In United States v. Decoster,
48 U.S.L.W. 2070 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), the court established a two-part test for deter-
mining whether a claim of incompetence will be considered. Under the Decoster test, a defend-
ant must demonstrate: (1) that the lawyer's performance fell measurably below the performance
ordinarily expected of fallible counsel; and (2) that the substandard performance affected the
outcome of the trial. Id. at 2071. This standaird, requiring the defendant to show both the
existence of a problem and an effect arising from it, is similar to the one suggested for dealing
with all procedural default exceptions. See text accompanying notes 165-175 infra. Moreover,
recent Illinois decisions also cast doubt upon the contention that allegations of defense counsel's
conflict of interest ensure appellate review despite procedural default. See note 155 infra.
108. See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 72 I11. 2d 36, 377 N.E.2d 17 (1978) (prosecutor suggested
defendant should be found guilty because two accomplices had been convicted); People v.
Duckett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 308 N.E.2d 590 (1974) (prosecutor's remarks appealed to racial prej-
udice); People v. Romero, 36 I11. 2d 315, 223 N.E.2d 121 (1967) (summation depicted defendant
as cause of girlfriend's drug addiction); People v. Weinst~in, 35 III. 2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432
(1966) (prosecutor asserted defendant had burden to introduce evidence of innocence); People v.
Morgan, 20 I11. 2d 437, 170 N.E.2d 529 (1960) (reference to defendant's failure to testify);
People -. Fort, 14 I11. 2d 491, 153 N.E.2d 26 (1958) (implied defendant had tendency toward
rape); People v. Moore, 9 11l. 2d 224, 137 N.E.2d 246 (1956) (characterized defendant as waging
war on society). Civil cases dealing with the same issue include Underwood v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 34 I11. 2d 367, 215 N.E.2d 236 (1966) (plaintiff's attorney referred to correspondence not
in evidence); Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 I11. 2d 548, 170 N.E.2d 564 (1960) (material informa-
tion detrimental to party offering was deleted from document in evidence); Belfield v. Coop, 8
I11. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956) (defendants characterized as thieves, usurpers and defraud-
ers).
109. People v. Sprinkle, 27 II1. 2d 398, 189 N.E.2d 295 (1963) (judge bolstered elderly wit-
ness's credibility with favorable comments); People v. Finn, 17 I11. 2d 614, 162 N.E.2d 354
(1959) (judge's statement indicated belief that insanity claim was a sham). One of the extremely
rare instances in which the Burger Court has reviewed unpreserved error involved seriously
improper judicial conduct. See United States v. Rogers, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) (judge told jury he
would accept verdict of guilty with extreme mercy of court but did not notify defendant or
defense counsel).
110. 14 Ill. 2d 491, 153 N.E.2d 26 (1958).
111. The court reasoned that the prosecutor's remarks were likely to leave the jury with the
impression that defendant was a habitual criminal. Id. at 501, 153 N.E.2d at 32. On this
ground, the court concluded that the remarks were so prejudicial to the defense that the ac-
cused did not receive a fair trial. Id. at 502, 153 N.E.2d at 32.
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those two children. Ladies and gentlemen, this defendant deserves no
mercy. Let your verdict show these rapists, and I mean this sincerely from
the bottom of my heart, let your verdicts show these rapists that they
cannot go about the streets of Chicago."1
2
Only two Illinois plain error cases involving improper judicial conduct
have been found. 113 In these the Illinois Supreme Court again concluded
that certain actions necessitate reversal despite defendants' failures to make
contemporaneous objections. The Court's remarks in People v. Sprinkle, 114
exemplify the type of conduct that the Illinois Supreme Court will not toler-
ate:
The record in this case contains questions and comments which have no
place in the conduct of a trial before a jury. They commence with the
complaining witness, an elderly woman somewhat rambling and unrespon-
sive in her testimony, apparently due to her advanced years, who was
asked by the presiding judge, at the conclusion of her testimony, how old
she was. Upon her response that she was eighty-five, the court com-
mented, "God bless you." Later the trial court commented to the witness:
"I think you are marvelous," and then proceeded to question the witness
as to whether she remembered anything about the man "who beat you at
your house." The court was informed by the State's Attorney that the wit-
ness had been unable to identify the defendant, following which the court
asked the witness: "The first time you have seen this man, since that time,
was today?" 115
People v. Bradley 116 presents the Illinois plain error rule's single identical
defendant case. 117 In Bradley, the trial judge severed the trial of two men
who originally were co-defendants. Bradley's counsel made no objection to
the severance. 118 The co-defendant was subsequently acquitted by the
judge due to certain evidence that the judge would not admit in Bradley's
jury trial. 119 After the jury found Bradley guilty, he appealed, claiming that
he had not forfeited his right to raise the severance issue. The court
agreed. 120 As in the post-conviction relief cases, common sense controlled.
Apart from the above decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court has often in-
voked the plain error rule in cases where the rule, in fact, played no part in
its overall decision to review an issue on appeal. In these.cases, involving
112. Id. at 500, 153 N.E.2d at 31.
113. See note 109 supra.
114. 27 I11. 2d 398, 189 N.E.2d 295 (1963).
115. Id. at 401, 189 N.E.2d at 297-98.
116. 30 Ill. 2d 597, 198 N.E.2d 809 (1964).
117. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
118. Id. at 601, 189 N.E.2d at 811.
119. Id. at 600, 189 N.E.2d at 811.
120. Id. at 601, 189 N.E.2d at 811.
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the death penalty, 121 important questions of law, 122 and mere technical de-
faults, 123 the court has improvidently used the plain error concept only be-
cause it wanted to focus on a completely appropriate substantive issue, but
apparently lacked justification for reaching that substantive issue. In these
cases, however, instead of invoking plain error, the court should have an-
nounced straightforwardly the reason for its decision to review an issue ap-
parently foreclosed by the procedural default rules.
Brief examination of two plain error decisions reveals the confusion that
could be avoided with a straightforward approach.1 2 4  In People v. Har-
ris,1 2 5 a recent homicide case, the Illinois Supreme Court devoted several
pages of a lengthy opinion to a determination of the proper mental element
to be specified in an attempted murder jury instruction. 1 26  Defense counsel
had objected to the instruction given at trial, but had failed to preserve the
121. Although no case holds that default rules are inapplicable in death penalty cases per se,
in capital cases courts have recognized unpreserved errors for reasons that appear strained. See
People v. Manzella, 56 I11. 2d 187, 306 N.E.2d 16 (1973) (error neither influenced jury nor
prejudiced defendant to the extent of denying fair trial); People v. Winchester, 352 I11. 237, 185
N.E. 580 (1933) (proof of guilt clear despite prejudicial error); People v. Carter, 327 I11. 233,
158 N.E. 436 (1927) (introduction of incompetent evidence discredited defendant's testimony);
People v. Dempsey, 47 I11. 323 (1868) (unsworn testimony went to jury). For discussion of the
Warren Court's decisions in the area of procedural default, see notes 35-39 and accompanying text
supra.
122. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 71 I11. 2d 95, 374 N.E.2d 472 (1978) (defendant's appeal
based on instructions tendered by defense); People v. Caesarez, 44 I11. 2d 180, 255 N.E.2d 1
(1969) (plain error review based on failure to request instruction).
123. A technical default occurs when trial counsel, whose objection was overruled, fails to
preserve the point properly in a post-trial motion or appellate brief. See, e.g., People v.
Morchian, 64 I11. 2d 257, 356 N.E.2d 71 (1976) (failure to file formal motion to suppress); People
v. Mayberry, 63 Il. 2d 1, 345 N.E.2d 97 (1976) (state failed to raise question of standing);
People v. Joyner, 50 I11. 2d 302, 278 N.E.2d 756 (1972) (failure to instruct jury); People v.
Holiday, 47 I11. 2d 300, 265 N. E.2d 634 (1971) (failure to move to suppress). Two recent United
States Supreme Court cases employ similar technical default reasoning. Anderson v. United
States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974) (jury instructions lacked specificity); Pipefitters Local Union v.
United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (erroneous jury instruction).
124. No attempt will be made to analyze death penalty cases and the procedural default
exceptions contained therein. The inapplicability of default rules in this context is obvious. In
fact, Justice White recently suggested that normal rules of trial practice and criminal procedure
might not apply in capital cases. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362-64 (1977) (White, J.,
concurring). One point must be made in that context, however. In death penalty cases where
bifurcated guilt/penalty trials take place, procedural default rules may be applied regarding the
guilt trial though not regarding the penalty trial. See an example of this process in People v.
Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980).
125. 72 Ill. 2d 16, 377 N.E.2d 28 (1978).
126. Id. at 18-28, 377 N.E.2d at 29-34. Jury instructions in an attempted murder prosecution
are problematic because of the various mental elements in the crime of murder, which are: (1)
intent to kill; (2) intent to do great bodily harm; or (3) knowledge that acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1977). The Illinois
Supreme Court's previous decisions conflicted as to the appropriate mental element in the
crime of attempted murder. Compare People v. Trinkle, 68 I11. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888 (1977)
(knowledge of probability of great bodily harm insufficient to satisfy mental element of at-
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objection in a post-trial motion. 127  Despite that technical default, the su-
preme court reviewed the issue presented by the instruction, characterizing
the error as plain error.' 28  Clearly the court should not have employed the
plain error rule. The court reviewed the error in order to resolve an appar-
ent conflict in its prior decisions. 1 29  It should have simply stated such.
Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the finality rule-affording trial
judges an opportunity to correct errors-would not have been served by
denying review in Harris for the error there was called to the judge's atten-
tion.
Use of the plain error rule in a case such as Harris should be rejected in
favor of a straightforward statement of the court's motives. In People v. Reh-
bein, 130 for example, the court was again faced with an important issue of
law, review of which was apparently foreclosed by a procedural default. 131
The court in Rehbein, however, simply admitted that it would review the
error as an exercise of its supervisory power. 132 It is suggested that clarity
in the procedural default context demands such an approach. Furthermore,
tempted murder) with People v. Muir, 67 I11. 2d 86, 365 N.E.2d 332 (1977) (upheld propriety of at-
tempted murder instructions containing knowledge of probability of death or great bodily harm
as mental element). See generally Note, Specific Intent Made More Specific: A Clarification of
the Law of Attempted Murder in Illinois-People v. Harris, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 157 (1978). The
instruction in People v. Harris, 72 I11. 2d 16, 377 N.E.2d 28 (1978), permitted the jury to
convict the accused of attempted murder without an intent to kill. Id. at 27, 377 N.E.2d
at 33. The court overruled Muir and held that intent to kill is the only acceptable mental state
in attempted murder instructions. Id. at 23, 377 N.E.2d at 31.
127. 72 Il. 2d at 28, 377 N.E.2d at 33-34.
128. Id.
129. See note 126 supra.
130. 74 II1. 2d 435, 386 N.E.2d 39 (1978).
131. The prosecution at trial made several references to the defendant's silence during inter-
rogation; however, defense counsel failed to object to the cross-examination. Id. at 439, 386
N.E.2d at 41.
132. The court stated;
We note that the defendant's failure to object at trial to the prosecutor's remark in
this case might well have waived the issue for purposes of appeal. However, be-
cause of the importance of the substantive issue of law involved here and the great
number of cases reaching the appellate courts on this issue we have elected to
decide the question of the prosecutor's remarks.
Id. at 435, 386 N.E.2d at 39. Another example of this straightforward approach can be found in
People v. Gilbert, 68 Ill. 2d 252, 258, 369 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1977) (reviewed unpreserved issue
regarding judge's examination of evidence because the issue was the "focal point" of much
recent litigation).
Almost immediately after rendering its Harris opinion, the Illinois court changed its mind
about the plain error aspects of that case. In People v. Roberts, 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331
(1978), the court acknowledged that the substantive portion of the Harris opinion constituted
the law of the case; the plain error holding had been improvident. Id. at 8, 387 N.E.2d at 334.
The court explicitly stated in Roberts that Harris had been decided despite the procedural
default, simply because an important question of law had to be resolved. Id. at 15, 387 N.E.2d
at 338.
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the benefits of clarity clearly outweigh any problems attendant to the crea-
tion of new methods for reaching issues on appeal. 133
From the plain error cases discussed above, a pattern of facts emerges that
helps define the elusive concept of "fundamental fairness." Whether the er-
rors in the noted cases involve defects in counsel, seriously improper judicial
and prosecutorial conduct, or even identical defendants, the errors suggest
more than typical trial mistakes. The errors reveal breakdowns in the adver-
sary system. 134 The errors impugn the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings. Thus, in short, "fundamental fairness" in the context
of plain errors, just as in the context of post-conviction relief statutes and
retroactivity, indicates something other than that the individual defendant
has forfeited his or her rights by procedurally defaulting. The judicial system
itself retains its own right to be free of certain particularly egregious er-
rors. 135
133. Objections, however, can be raised to the Rehbein court's approach, not the least of
these being that this approach may once again allow excessive discretion into the process of
deciding which errors will be reviewed and which will not. What one judge may consider
important, another might view as relatively minor. Again personal feelings and personal judicial
philosophies may control. A second objection to this approach is that by reaching an issue that
has not been preserved properly, the court may be issuing an advisory opinion or stating mere
dicta.
Similar objections can be raised regarding the technical defaults method of review discussed
earlier. See note 123 supra. Rules of procedure are necessarily of a technical nature. Often a
procedural line is drawn at some specific point simply because a line has to be drawn some-
where and that somewhere was a relatively sensible place to draw one. When technical rules of
procedure are abandoned or avoided by appellate courts, the line between permissible and
impermissible conduct becomes vague. Neither lawyers nor judges can then tell what rules will
be enforced. Discretion and its concomitant problems enter the picture. A recent case illus-
trates the point. In People v. Lott, 66 Il. 2d 290, 362 N.E.2d 312 (1977), five judges thought
that a mere 'technical defect occurred, id. at 296, 362 N.E.2d at 314; two judges thought that
the default posed a fatal problem for review, id. at 302-03, 362 N.E.2d at 317. Regardless of
which opinion seems more convincing in that particular case, the ambiguity arising from it
bodes only ill.
134. See note 87 supra.
135. Several situations not discussed in the text also should be noted. First, presumably a
defendant can raise a question of a void indictment at any time. This appears to be a procedural
default exception based on the jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., People v. Gregory, 59 I11. 2d
111, 319 N.E.2d 483 (1974); People v. Borgeson, 335 II1. 136, 166 N.E. 451 (1929). The
second situation involves unfit defendants. Older cases implied that a question of unfitness
could be raised at any time. E.g., People v. Thompson, 36 Il. 2d 332, 223 N.E.2d 97 (1967);
People v. McKinstray, 30 Ill. 2d 611, 198 N.E.2d 829 (1964); People v. Burson, 11 111. 2d 360,
143 N.E.2d 239 (1957). The results of these cases have been called into question, however, by
more recent cases. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 76 I11. 2d 365, 392 N.E.2d 6 (1979) (facts did not
establish bona fide doubt of competency required by code of corrections). The discrepancy
arises because ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(c) requires that a bona fide doubt of defend-
ant's competency be established before a court must order that a competency determination be
made.
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D. The Closely Balanced Evidence Rule
The foregoing analysis has traveled only half the road to a definition of
"fundamental fairness" and to an outline of the contours of procedural de-
fault exceptions. Though a breakdown in the adversary system must be a
prerequisite to procedural default relief, it is not always easy to recognize
such a breakdown. Thus, mere substitution of the "breakdown" standard for
the more elastic "fundamental fairness" standard adds little clarity. In short,
because the breakdown standard potentially presents as many pitfalls as does
the unworkable fairness standard, attention must now be directed toward a
second element referred to in several Illinois procedural default cases-the
"closely balanced evidence" rule.
Under the closely balanced evidence rule, unobjected errors or untimely
motions will be recognized on appeal only in cases where the evidence at
trial was closely balanced. 136 The rule enables courts to review errors that
arguably might have contributed to an unjust conviction. However, as will
be demonstrated below, although the purpose of the closely balanced evi-
dence rule is certainly valid, use of that rule could very well defeat the
purposes underlying the basic rules of procedural default.
The origin of the closely balanced evidence rule is found in plain error
decisions involving inadequate trial counsel. In 1922, the Illinois Supreme
Court explained, in People v. Gardiner, 137 that defense counsel's poor per-
formance would not justify the reversal of a conviction reasonably supported
by the evidence. 138 The court went on to explain, however, that in cases in
which the evidence is close and in which the trial court allowed the pros-
136. People v. Pickett, 54 Ill. 2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856 (1973). See, e.g., People v. Roberts,
75 I11. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331 (1978) (evidence in attempted murder case held not closely bal-
anced). The best overall statement of the rule appears in a significant concurring opinion by
Judge Ryan, the Illinois Supreme Court's most careful student of the procedural default prob-
lem.
[A] significant purpose of the plain error rule is to afford certain protections to the
defendant. If a serious injustice has been done to a defendant, it should be cor-
rected. To this end the strength or the weakness of the evidence against him is
relevant. . . .Thus, this court has held that in a criminal case where the evidence
is closely balanced a court of review may consider errors that have not been prop-
erly preserved for review. . . .When the evidence is closely balanced, there is the
possibility that an innocent person may have been convicted because of some error
which is obvious in the record, but which was not properly preserved for review. In
order to prevent such a serious miscarriage of justice, a court of review may con-
sider the error. However, in doing so the court will look at the record only to see if
the evidence is "closely balanced.'" If it is not, the reason for considering the error
in the absence of its preservation is not present. There is no need to apply the
harmless error test or, if the error involves a constitutional right ...the harmless-
beyond- a-reasonable-doubt test.
People v. Green, 74 II1. 2d 444, 454, 386 N.E.2d 272, 277 (1979) (emphasis in original) (Ryan,
J., concurring).
137. 303 I11. 204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922).
138. Id. at 206-07, 135 N.E. at 423.
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ecutor to take advantage of a poorly represented defendant, the court would
consider even errors not properly preserved for review. 139 The use of the
close evidence requirement to consider an ineffective assistance claim was
also espoused by the court in People v. Nowak. 140
In subsequent plain error cases, the Illinois Supreme Court has unfortu-
nately relied on the Gardiner and Nowak decisions not for the proposition
that close evidence is a prerequisite for plain error relief on ineffective assist-
ance grounds but for the much broader assertion that a court may consider
unpreserved errors in criminal cases whenever the evidence is closely bal-
anced. 141 In many modern cases, therefore, the standard that began as a
restriction upon relief from errors stemming from incompetent counsel has
been used at least implicitly as a vehicle for review of any error in any close
case. 142
Expansion of the plain error exception through excessive use of the closely
balanced evidence rule jeopardizes the policies underlying the forfeiture
rule. If appellate courts can review errors whenever the evidence at trials is
close, the forfeiture principle will have been completely replaced by the
harmless error rule. 143 If the harmless error rule becomes the norm, trial
139. Id.
140. 372 I11. 381, 24 N.E.2d 50 (1940). See notes 103-107 and accompanying text supra.
141. The first case to expand the close evidence standard was People v. Bradley, 30 I11, 2d
597, 198 N.E.2d 809 (1964). In Bradley, the court relied upon a determination that the evi-
dence was closely balanced to justify review of an improper trial severance to which objection
had not been made. See notes 116-120 and accompanying text supra. Bradley, Nowak and
Gardiner are routinely cited for the proposition that a close case justifies appellate review of
unpreserved trial errors. See, e.g., People v. Green, 74 I11. 2d at 454, 386 N.E.2d at 277 (Ryan,
J., concurring); People v. Pickett, 54 I11. 2d at 283, 296 N.E.2d at 858. Occasionally, People v.
Schulman, 299 I11. 125, 132 N.E. 530 (1921), is cited as well. But in that case, which also
involved ineffective counsel, the court did not articulate a close evidence standard. Justice Ryan
of the Illinois Supreme Court, the court's most forceful advocate of the rule, recently articulated
the necessity of close evidence as a prerequisite to procedural default exception review in
People v. Carlson, 79 I11. 2d 564, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980). Judge Ryan views the rule quite
restrictively, however, usually using it as justification for not reviewing errors.
142. See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 65 Ill. App. 3d 525, 382 N.E.2d 303 (1st Dist. 1978) (because
genuine evidentiary conflict existed, court reviewed unpreserved errors involving admissibility
of evidence and propriety of jury instructions); People v. Terranova, 49 Ill. App. 3d 360, 364
N.E.2d 357 (1st Dist. 1977) (unpreserved errors affecting credibility of identification witness
reviewable because testimony of two witnesses for prosecution balanced that of two defendants
denying guilt); People v. Torres, 47 Ill. App. 3d 101, 361 N.E.2d 803 (1st Dist. 1977) (denial of
motion for new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence held plain error because case was
close); People v. Bell, 61 111. App. 2d 224, 209 N.E.2d 366 (4th Dist. 1965) (unpreserved error
in witness' attack on defendant's credibility and improper denial of motion to recall court's
witness held reviewable because evidence was closely balanced).
143. Properly preserving an error for appellate review does not ensure reversal because the
guarantee of a fair trial does not require an error-free trial. People v. Ashley, 18 I11. 2d 272, 164
N.E.2d 70, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 815 (1960). When the error reasonably could not have af-
fected the outcome of the trial, the error is deemed harmless and the conviction is affirmed.
People v. Cardinelli, 297 I11. 116, 130 N.E. 355 (1921). When the error involves a federal
constitutional right, the standard to be employed is one of harmlessness beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1961).
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counsel will have little incentive to make contemporaneous objections or
timely motions. 144 Thus, expansion of the plain error concept through the
closely balanced evidence rule robs convictions of finality and deprives trial
judges of the opportunity to correct errors at trial.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the closely balanced evidence rule,
however, that rule has some value. In fact, disregard of it has led to poorly
reasoned conclusions in a group of recent plain error cases. 145 Three of
those cases will be examined.
In People v. Jenkins, 146 the court clearly stated the correct rule of law
when it stated that the presence of diametrically opposed jury instructions
144. When an unpreserved error may have contributed to a conviction, the court is likely to
determine that tlse evidence was close. When a trial error does not contribute to a conviction,
nothing is lost by failing to preserve it, because, even if preserved, it must be deemed harm-
less. One commentator has asserted that the Illinois plain error exception may have rendered
the preservation of errors in new trial motions unnecessary. See Aspen, New Illinois Appellate
Procedure in Criminal Cases; 53 ILL. B.J. 52, 56 (1964). But see Leighton, Post Conviction
Remedies in Illinois Criminal Procedure, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 540, 543 (no lawyer should rely on
plain error rule as substitute for timely new trial motion).
145. Also, it should be noted that the following cases in the text did not mention the United
States Supreme Court's recent change of position in the area of procedural default. See notes
40-43 and accompanying text supra.
146. 69 I11. 2d 61, 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977). Jenkins involved a challenge to jury instructions
typical of cases that plagued courts in the Warren era. In one of the Warren Court cases,
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944), the court reviewed an unpreserved error in jury
instructions that incorrectly stated the mental element involved in the violation of another's civil
rights under color of state law. No exception had been taken at trial, but the Court stated that it
would review the error because it was "so fundamental as not to submit to the jury the essential
ingredients" of the offense. Id. at 107. Following the Screws decision, many federal and state
appellate courts concluded that certain types of instruction errors had to be reviewed regardless
of the absence of trial objections. Defects that had to be reviewed often were classified as those
failing to contain an essential element of the offense charged and those in which the element of
knowledge or burden of proof were defined inaccurately or not at all. See, e.g., Findley v.
United States, 362 F.2d 922, 923 (10th Cir. 1966) (plain error not to instruct on necessary intent
element of larceny); United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 1965) (failure to explain
relevance of criminal intent reviewable error because it involved essential element); Beardon v.
United States, 320 F.2d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1963) (failure to instruct on meaning of"transport" in
prosecution for transporting stolen goods, in interstate commerce held reviewable); Jones v.
United States, 308 F.2d 307, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (failure to instruct that jury must find beyond
reasonable doubt that defendant had duty to provide necessities for infant to convict for man-
slaughter held reviewable); People v. Joyner, 50 Ill. 2d 302, 278 N.E.2d 756 (1972) (failure to
instruct on elements of lesser included offense held substantial error); People v. Cesarez, 44 Ill.
2d 180, 255 N.E.2d 1 (1969) (failure to instruct that defendant had to be shown guilty beyond
reasonable doubt was substantial error); State v. Walsh, 81 N.M. 65, 463 P.2d 41 (1969) (failure
to instruct that "use of force or violence" was essential element of armed robbery); Common-
wealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968) (instructions allowing conviction when jury
had a reasonable doubt of guilt held reviewable). See generally 5 & 6 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES §§ 30:56 & 52:47 (1967). Ultimately these categoriza-
tions of instruction error were formulated as required exceptions to procedural default rules.
ABA Standards, Trial By Jury § 4.6(c), (Commentary) (Appr. Draft 1968). The ABA draft is
based on the Illinois Supreme Court's Rule 451, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.1l0A, § 451 (1977). It is
suggested that these exceptions have been all but eliminated by recent United States Supreme
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could generate appellate reversal despite a procedural default. 147 The ad-
versary system surely cannot be said to be functioning adequately when
judges instruct juries to accept both adversaries' theories, even though con-
tradictory. 148 However, even if the instructions in Jenkins were erroneous,
the court should not have reversed because there was little indication that
the discrepancy affected the case's overall result. 149
Court cases, notably, Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977), in which the court stated: "It is
the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when
no objection has been made in the trial court." id. at 154. In Henderson, reversal was not
granted where an error was not preserved despite the absence of an instruction on an essential
element of causation. See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (non-instruction error
involving presumption of innocence forfeited); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (es-
sential element of offense allegedly omitted from instructions). In two very recent cases the
Illinois Supreme Court has stated that it follows the ABA's essential elements test, but at the
same time has determined that major elements of definitions of crimes were not "essential."
People v. Roberts, 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331 (1978) (not substantial error where instructions
allowed attempted murder conviction with lesser intent than intent to kill); People v.
Underwood, 72 I11. 2d 124, 378 N.E.2d 513 (1978) (failure to instruct on "reasonably believes"
in connection with self-defense issue not substantial error in armed robbery case).
147. See Polarsky v. United States, 332 F.2d 233 (1st Cir. 1964) (repeated reference in in-
structions to statute which defendant was not charged with conspiracy to violate required rever-
sal); People v. Miller, 403 I11. 561, 87 N.E.2d 649 (1949) (contradictory instructions are never
harmless error); People v. Wright, 24 III. App. 3d 536, 321 N.E.2d 52 (2d Dist. 1974) (conflict-
ing self-defense instructions). See generally 5 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES § 30:56 (1967).
148. Jenkins was a homicide prosecution in which self-defense was at issue. The court gave
both of the following instructions:
The crime attempted need not have been committed, to sustain the charge of
attempt the State must prove the following propositions: first that the defendant
performed an act which constituted a substantial step towards the commission of the
crime of murder and second that the defendant did so with intent to commit the
crime of murder.
Submitted by prosecution, based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions 2d § 6.07 (1971). 69 Ill.
2d at 64-65, 370 N.E.2d at 533.
To prove the charge of attempted murder, the State must prove the following:
proposition first, that the defendant performed an act which constitutes a substantial
step towards actually committing the crime of murder and second, that the defend-
ant did so with intent to commit the crime of murder. And third, that the defend-
ant was not justified in using the force which he used.
Submitted by defendant, based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions 2d § 25.05 (1975). 69 III.
2d at 64-65, 370 N.E.2d at 533.
As the appellate court stated, the instructions "were not in direct conflict .... The state's
instruction was an incomplete statement of the law, not an incorrect one. The defendant's in-
struction supplemented the state's, it did not contradict it." People v. Jenkins, 43 I11. App. 3d
831, 834, 357 N.E.2d 192, 194 (1st Dist. 1976), revd, 69 I11. 2d 61, 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977). See
People v. Robinson, 21 111. App. 3d 343, 315 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 1974) (objection waived in
self-defense case where one set of instructions included defense but other did not).
149. The court did not review the evidence, but still asserted that "[a]s far as can be known,
defendant might well have been convicted on the erroneous instruction." 69 I11. 2d at 67,
370 N.E.2d at 534.
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The court strayed even further from employing the closely balanced evi-
dence rule as a restriction on plain error review in People v. Green. 150 The
court in Green held that a trial error was both plain error and harmless. 151
That result seems intrinsically contradictory. Errors cannot be so basic that
they impugn the integrity of the judicial system, so serious that fundamental
fairness requires them to be considered, and yet still harmless. 152
Finally, in People v. Precup, 153 Justice Ryan, the major advocate of the
closely balanced evidence rule, was faced with allegations of a per se conflict
of interest arising out of an attorney's representation of co-defendants. 154
The conflict issue was not raised at trial. 155 Justice Ryan and the court saw
150. 74 Ill. 2d 444, 386 N.E.2d 272 (1979). The case is noteworthy because of Justice Ryan's
detailed examination of the plain error exception in his concurring opinion. See note 136 supra.
151. Id. at 450-53, 386 N.E.2d at 275-76.
152. The court did, in effect, apply the closely balanced evidence rule by determining that
the evidence against the defendant was too strong to permit retrial. If, instead, it would have
applied the close evidence rule as a restriction on the plain error exception, the court could
have resolved the question much earlier by simply denying review. The position that error can
be both plain error and harmless is not without precedent. See United States v. Lopez, 575
F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutorial reference to defendant's post-arrest silence held
plain error but harmless beyond reasonable doubt). This position may, however, be restricted to
the Ninth Circuit. See e.g., United States v. Miranda, 593 F.2d 590, 596 (5th Cir. 1978)
(tautological that when plain error is uncovered, state cannot hide behind harmless error rule).
Illinois cases have referred to automatically reversible errors as "plain error." E.g., People v.
Burton, 44 I11. 2d 53, 254 N.E.2d 527 (1969) (prosecutor's reference termed "plain error" and
ground for reversal said to be not directly related to guilt); People v. Wollenberg, 37 I11. 2d
480, 229 N.E.2d 490 (1967) (reference to silence termed plain error, "accordingly" conviction
reversed).
153. 73 II1. 2d 7, 382 N.E.2d 227 (1978).
154. Illinois has a per se conflict of interest rule that presumes prejudice when conflicts of
interest are discovered in criminal defense counsel. People v. Coslet, 67 I11. 2d 127, 133, 364
N.E.2d 67, 70 (1977). See generally Ehrmann, The Per Se Conflict of Interest Rule in Illinois,
66 ILL. B.J. 578 (1978).
155. The defendant in Precup argued that the trial judge had erred by not ordering sever-
ance sua sponte when counsel, representing co-defendants, permitted a police officer to testify
to defendant's partially inconsistent pre-trial statements. The court held this was not error. It
reasoned that defense counsel may have elected to allow the officer to testify in order to get the
statements into evidence because they set up an alibi defense. Because it saw no error involving
substantial rights on the face of the record, it would not entertain unpreserved issues regarding
the effect the defendants' adverse positions might have had upon their rights to effective assist-
ance of counsel. People v. Precup, 73 I11. 2d at 18-19, 382 N.E.2d at 232. The Precup decision
implies that allegations of a conflict of interest of defense counsel will not automatically trigger
plain error review. It seems equitable that a defendant ought to establish that the alleged
conflict could have in fact affected the outcome of his trial in order to merit exception to the
default rule. In People v. Fife, 76 I11. 2d 418, 392 N.E.2d 1345 (1979), the court found a per se
conflict because defense counsel was a special assistant attorney general. The court reversed
Fife's conviction without examining the weight of the evidence against him. Id. at 425-26, 392
N.E.2d at 1348-49. This reversal seems pointless if the evidence against the defendant was
strong enough to convict him on retrial. Fife also contradicts the relationship between pro-
cedural default exceptions and retroactivity established earlier. See notes 58-66 and accompany-
ing text supra. The court reviewed the error even though the defendant had made no contem-
poraneous trial objection; yet, it determined that the rule would not be given full retroactive
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no error on the face of the record and, consequently, refused to consider
whether the multiple representation deprived the defendants of their right
to effective assistance of counsel. Although the refusal to grant plain error
review in this case indicates at least an implicit determination that the evi-
dence in the case was not closely balanced, the absence of explicit discussion
of the evidence undermines the decision's reasoning. Furthermore, because
the case involved alleged defects in counsel, it probably should have gained
procedural default exception review but for the evidence issue.
The fact that these few cases have been singled out as incorrectly reasoned
should not be read to indicate that the remainder of the Illinois courts' mod-
ern plain error decisions reached the right result for the right reason. In
fact, the opposite is true. Many modern cases are implicitly or explicitly
contradictory, exemplifying a basic conflict among the various justices of the
Illinois court regarding interpretation of the plain error exception. 156 This
conflict among the justices has led to the problems predicted by writers1 57
who, with great prescience, asserted that discretion in the context of pro-
cedural defaults is a sure road to unfair and arbitrary results. Indeed, factual
support exists for an argument that imprecision in default rules and differ-
ences of opinion among the various justices, combined with the Illinois
courts' method of assigning appellate opinions to justices by a strict rotation
system, has produced some judgments that may well be based merely upon
the luck of the draw. 158
effect. 76 II. 2d at 425-26, 392 N.E.2d at 1348-49. See generally Note, The Per Se Conflict of
Interest Rule Applied to Special Assistant Attorneys General Serving as Defense Counsel: People
v. Fife, 29 DEPAUL L. REv. 585 (1980). Despite the broad holding in Fife, subsequent decisions
have not held that allegations of a per se conflict guarantee plain error review. In People v.
Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d 41, 394 N.E.2d 1185 (1979), and People v. Lykins, 77 I11. 2d 35, 394
N.E.2d 1182 (1979), the defendants were represented by trial counsel who worked as special
assistant attorneys general. Nevertheless, the court denied review of their claims of ineffective
assistance because of their failure to raise the conflict of interest question in the trial court.
156. See note 158 infra.
157. See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
158. Compare People v. Roberts, 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331 (1978) (attempted murder
instruction error not plain error) with People v. Harris, 72 I11. 2d 16, 377 N.E.2d 28 (1978)
(same instruction error held plain error). Compare People v. Godsey, 74 II1. 2d 64, 383 N.E.2d
988 (1978) (reference to refusal to testify at grand jury hearing held plain error) with People v.
Rehbein, 74 111. 2d 435, 386 N.E.2d 39 (1978) (reference to silence apparently not plain error).
The following cases denying plain error relief cannot be distinguished from cases cited earlier
granting such relief: People v. Knight, 75 I11. 2d 291, 388 N.E.2d 414 (1979) (because no objec-
tion to sufficiency of evidence was made at probation revocation hearing, objection held waived
in court review); People v. Belier, 74 II1. 2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857 (1979) (challenge to propriety
of prosecutor's comments waived for failure to object at trial); People v. Coles, 74 Ill. 2d 393,
385 N.E.2d 94 (1979) (failure to raise issue at trial waived objection to improper restriction on
cross-examination of prosecution witness); People v. Vriner, 74 III. 2d 329, 385 N.E.2d 671
(1978) (defect in armed violence instruction held not plain error); People v. Edwards, 74 Ill. 2d
1, 383 N.E.2d 944 (1978) (waiver of closing arguments transcript and mere partial preservation
of record precluded plain error review of prosecutor's remarks); People v. Underwood, 72 I11.
2d 124, 378 N.E.2d 513 (1978) (failure to instruct on "reasonably believes" in regard to self-
defense issue held not plain error); People v. Grant, 71 111. 2d 551, 377 N.E.2d 4 (1978) (failure
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Although such untoward consequences have been produced both by mis-
use of the closely balanced evidence rule (expansion of plain error review to
allow review of all errors in close cases) and by disregard of it (incorrectly
reasoned decisions), the value of the rule as a restriction on plain error re-
view should not be obscured. The rule makes eminent sense. It seems
facetious to suggest that an error constitutes an affront to the dignity of the
legal system if that error did not even arguably contribute to a wrong result.
The value of the closely balanced evidence rule does not stop at that
point, however. The closely balanced evidence rule dramatically echoes
modern developments in the law of federal habeas corpus. 159 Under the
standard espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright
v. Sykes, 160 procedural defaults will be disregarded only if the defendant
shows both a cause for a default and prejudice produced by it. That "prej-
udice" element, of course, like the closely balanced evidence restriction, is
designed to afford review only when defaults might have contributed to un-
just convictions. 161
to instruct on defense of involuntary conduct held not plain error where epileptic defendant
relied solely upon insanity defense); People v. Gilbert, 68 I11. 2d 252, 359 N.E.2d 849 (1977)
(ordinarily, issue of judge's improper examination of evidence is waived by failure to raise issue
at trial); People v. Waller, 67 I11. 2d 381, 367 N.E.2d 1283 (1977) (improper admission of
rebuttal testimony waived for failure to insist on subsequent ruling after court had reserved
ruling on matter); People v. Frey, 67 Ill. 2d 77, 364 N.E.2d 46 (1977) (proper to dismiss appeals
of defendants who failed to make timely motions to withdraw. guilty pleas and vacate judge-
ments).
159. At the close of the Warren era, under Fay v. Noia,. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), federal district
courts could review constitutional claims of state prisoners as long as they did not deliberately
bypass state procedures for adjudication of the issues. Beginning in 1973, a series of Burger
court cases changed the standard. In Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), the Court
held that an applicant under the federal conviction habeas corpus statute, who, for the first time,
objected to the composition of the grand jury that indicted him, must show cause why the issue
was not raised before trial and actual prejudice. Three years later, in Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536 (1976), a state prisoner sought post-conviction relief on the ground that the grand jury
that indicted him was unconstitutionally selected. Because the state courts had held that the
defendant's claim was waived for failure to raise it in the lower courts, the Supreme Court, as a
matter of comity, held that the cause and prejudice standard enunciated in Davis applied. The
Supreme Court soon imposed the cause and prejudice requirement outside the grand jury area.
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Court held that habeas corpus review of a
challenge to the admissibility of a confession, which was waived under state procedural default
rules, was barred unless the cause and prejudice standard was met. See generally Hill, The
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1050 (1978); Soloff,
Litigation and Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297 (1978); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger
Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1978).
160. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
161. Language in the Wainwright opinion demonstrates how similar the cause and prejudice
standard is to a closely balanced evidence restriction on plain error. The Supreme Court con-
cluded:
The "cause-and-prejudice" exception of the [default] rule will afford an adequate
guarantee, we think, that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court from
adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in
the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice.
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A CONJUNCTIVE TEST
Analysis of Illinois case law has shown that fundamental fairness in the
context of procedural defaults is composed of two separate elements. Some
cases demonstrate that default rules do not control if breakdowns in the
adversary system have occurred. 162 Other decisions show that relief will be
granted in cases where the evidence is closely balanced. 163 Traditionally,
those two elements have been kept separate in the cases. Thus, for example,
courts and writers take it almost as an article of faith that some errors are so
basic, so fundamental, that they require reversal regardless of the evidence
arrayed against the defendant. 164 When such errors occur, closely balanced
evidence need not be shown.
Procedural default exceptions can be defined by resort to either a disjunc-
tive or a conjunctive test. The traditional separation of the elements dis-
cussed above presents the disjunctive test. Either closely balanced evidence
or extremely severe trial errors may generate reversal despite defaults.
Under the conjunctive test, both serious error and closely balanced evidence
must be established.
The disjunctive approach simply does not work. The two elements of seri-
ous errors and closely balanced evidence cannot be separated if a workable
definition of procedural default exceptions is sought. No definition of funda-
mental fairness 165 has ever succeeded in distinguishing fundamental fairness
from fundamental unfairness. Furthermore, no definition has ever been able
to pinpoint what errors are so grievous that they require reversal regardless
of evidence against a defendant. Thus, only judges' personal feelings control
and unbridled discretion reigns.
Whatever precise content may be given those terms by later cases, we feel confi-
dent in holding without further elaboration that they do not exist here. Respondent
has advanced no explanation whatever for his failure to object at trial, and, as the
proceeding unfolded, the trial judge is certainly not to be faulted for failing to
question the admission of the confession himself. The other evidence of guilt pre-
sented at trial, moreover, was substantial to a degree that would negate any possi-
bility of actual prejudice resulting to the respondent from the admission of his in-
culpatory statement.
Id. at 90-91.
162. See notes 73-84, 100-115, and accompanying text supra. Cf. People v. Moore, 9 II1. 2d
224, 232, 137 N.E.2d 246, 250 (1956) (prejudicial arguments permissible if judicial process
stands without deterioration).
163. See notes 136-158 and accompanying text supra.
164. People v. Green, 74 I11. 2d 444, 454-57, 386 N.E.2d 277-78 (1979) (Ryan, J., concur-
ring). See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1941) (instruction defect held fundamen-
tal error); United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204, 205 (10th Cir. 1970) (reversal despite more
than ample evidence supporting conviction). See generally 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 856 (1969); Kiely, Criminal Law: Justice After Trial, 23 DEPAUL L. REV.
249 (1973).
165. See notes 51-57 and accompanying text supra.
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Inability to define fundamental fairness or to identify particularly grievous
errors does not pose the only problem for the disjunctive test. Use of the
closely balanced evidence element of the disjunctive test by itself produces
an equally severe problem. A criminal defendant who can establish both
closely balanced evidence and any type of trial error may obtain a reversal
on appeal despite the absence of a timely motion or contemporaneous objec-
tion to the error. 166 That fact, in turn, eliminates any differences between
the standard used to judge errors that have been preserved at trial and the
one used to judge errors that escaped notice at trial. 167
These problems have generated a distinct change in the case law in recent
years. When the United States Supreme Court adopted the cause and prej-
udice test 168 for habeas corpus relief in the mid-1970's, it abandoned the
previously accepted disjunctive approach to procedural defaults. 169 By re-
placing that disjunctive approach with the two-part conjunctive "cause and
prejudice" test, the court recognized the intrinsic weakness of any attempt to
define fundamental fairness in a vacuum of facts.
Conversely, however, the conjunctive test-under which both serious
error and closely balanced evidence are required to generate review and
reversal-accepts the vagueness of the fundamental fairness terminology,
and, in fact, builds on it. In the conjunctive test the concept of fundamental
fairness is made concrete by first carefully defining the concept's constituent
parts and then by consciously leaving the interrelationship between those
parts undefined.
The conjunctive approach accomplishes the desired objective by providing
criteria for determining which errors are particularly grievous and which
grievous errors require new trials. Errors can be deemed particularly griev-
ous in cases where the facts indicate that the adversary system has broken down.
They occur when the integrity of the judicial process itself has been im-
pugned by the error. Grievous errors should generate review and reversal,
however, only in situations where the evidence is closely balanced. Reversal
is appropriate only in cases where defendants can establish that they were
actually prejudiced by the errors. 170 In short, if errors did not contribute to
arguably wrong results they need not generate reversal.
166. See notes 141-142 and accompanying text supra.
167. See note 143 and accompanying text supra. Recognizing the difficulties presented by
using the closely balanced evidence rule alone, many courts simply ignore it and rely solely on
attempts to define fundamental fairness. E.g., People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 386 N.E.2d 272
(1979); People v. Burrows, 64 Ill. App. 3d 764, 381 N.E.2d 1040 (4th Dist. 1978) (majority saw
no plain error but dissent claimed evidence was closely balanced).
168. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 159-161 and accompanying text supra.
170. A significant school of thought refers to this as the "colorable showing of innocence
standard." See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CHI. L. 11Ev. 142, 160 (1970). The language Judge Friendly uses to describe this standard is
remarkably similar to both the cause and prejudice standard and the closely balanced evidence
rule:
Before going further I should clarify what I mean by a colorable showing of inno-
cence. I can begin with a negative. A defendant would not bring himself within this
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:753
Although the two elements described above have been defined with some
precision, the interplay between them remains intentionally vague. For
example, in cases in which trial errors were particularly outrageous (such as in
the cases discussed herein in which judges made the statements: " That man
is a rapist now" 171 and "I think you are marvelous"172), the evidence need
not be as closely balanced to justify reversal as it must be in cases involving
errors barely qualifying as evidence of breakdowns in the adversary sys-
tem. 173 Moreover, if the evidence in a case is such that no conviction could
have been obtained absent the error, the court would certainly be justified
in overturning a conviction even absent a breakdown in the system. 1 74
Conversely, if evidence against defendants presents clear proof of guilt, and
the errors themselves clearly did not contribute to wrongful convictions,
perhaps only the most blatantly shocking error would require reversal.
This analysis leaves only one question remaining. What is a blatantly
shocking error? Such an error must be defined by looking to the overall
criterion by showing that he might not, or even would not, have been convicted in
the absence of evidence claimed to have been unconstitutionally obtained. Many
offenders, for example, could not be convicted without the introduction of property
seized from their persons, homes or offices. On the other hand, except for the
unusual case where there is an issue with respect to the defendant's connection
with the property, such evidence is the clearest proof of guilt, and a defendant
would not come within the criterion simply because the jury might not, or even
probably would not, have convicted without the seized property being in evidence.
Perhaps as good a formulation of the criterion as any is that the petitioner for collat-
eral attack must show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability
of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have
become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a
reasonable doubt of his guilt.
id.
Some courts and commentators have extensively discussed the issue of burden of proof in
the context of proof of prejudice. The issue is whether defendants must show that prejudice
exists, or whether the state must show that it does not exist. See United States v. Decoster, 48
U.S.L.W. 2070 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc); Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assist-
ance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 752 (1980). Concentration on the issue of burden of proof in the context of plain error
seems unnecessary. It is suggested that appellate judges will, in fact, evaluate evidence in a
criminal trial in the same manner regardless of technical rules concerning burden of proof.
171. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
172. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
173. Serious instruction errors would fall into the latter category, because they only affect the
adversary system tangentially. See the discussion of instruction error at note 146 supra.
174. See, e.g., Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974) (evidence insufficient to es-
tablish element of contributing to delinquency of a minor); People v. Harrison, 25 I11. 2d 407,
185 N.E.2d 244 (1962) (identification evidence insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt). Recently, the Supreme Court may have broadly expanded the number of situations in
which a federal habeas corpus court can assess the quantity of evidence presented against state
criminal defendants. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (habeas court must find evi-
dence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, some evidence is insufficient).
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integrity of the adversary system. Such errors occur only if the system itself
would be held in higher esteem following remand for a virtually pointless
second trial, a "show trial" for all practical purposes, than it would be follow-
ing appellate court acknowledgment of the fact that a very, very serious
error had occurred, accompanied by a conclusion that that error had not
contributed to an unjust result. Perhaps a circus trial would qualify as a blatantly
shocking error. Or a situation where some overall social policy, independent of
the process for finding guilt or innocence, controlled. Racial discrimination
at trial might work. 175 Little else would do. Expansion of this exception
must not occur. Common sense indicates that criminal trials serve the pur-
pose of establishing guilt or innocence. The existence of guilt or innocence
should thus be, almost always, the controlling factor in determining whether
new trials should occur.
CONCLUSION
Much confusion has been generated by the United States and Illinois Su-
preme Courts in cases dealing with procedural defaults. The United States
Court has flip-flopped on the issue; the Illinois court has simply never made
up its mind one way or the other. Both courts talk about "fundamental fair-
ness," but neither defines it. Despite the confusion in the language of the
cases, it has been suggested herein that a pattern emerges from the actual
facts of the cases that grant procedural default relief. This pattern has been
found by examining primarily the Illinois cases. The Illinois pattern in turn
suggests a method by which other state and federal courts can resolve their
own procedural default questions. What is more, the Illinois pattern pro-
vides an alternative formulation to that of the United States Supreme Court's
"cause and prejudice" test.
The Illinois cases, read as a group, articulate a two-step, conjunctive test
for establishing exceptions to the procedural default rule. First, the criminal
175. A recent case in which the Court refused to consider guilt or innocence presents a
perfect example of a situation in which a policy independent of that involved in the criminal
trial and appeal process takes precedence. In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), the Court
emphatically stated that racial discrimination in the selection or composition of a grand jury
would not be tolerated. The policy against racial descrimination is so strong that it must take
precedence over the policy favoring trials as simply a method for determining guilt or inno-
cence.
The Burger Court's commitment to the trial process as first and foremost a process for deter-
mining guilt or innocence should not be called into question by the existence of such occassional
exceptions. The Court at the present time does not view the criminal trial or appellate process
as a means to promulgate broader social views. A sharp contrast appears between the Burger
and Warren Courts in this respect. The Warren Court's abandonment of the finality rule, see
notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra, was based on the same ground as its enthusiastic
embrace of the exclusionary rule-a view of the trial and appellate process as, at least in part, a
prophylactic method for dealing with certain types of official misconduct. The Burger Court,
unconvinced of the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule, has sought ways to limit the impact
of the rule. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). It stands to reason that the Burger Court
should downplay the deterrent value of abandoning the finality rule in procedural defaults as
well.
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defendant must show that the unpreserved error impugned the integrity of
the judicial system itself. The error must evidence a breakdown in the ad-
versary system of justice. Such a breakdown in the system virtually always
occurs in circumstances involving a defect in counsel or seriously improper
conduct. Second, the defendant must show that the evidence introduced at
his or her trial is closely balanced. To do this the defendant must establish that
he or she was prejudiced by the error and that a new trial might well result
in an acquittal. These two elements of the conjunctive test are then brought
together and balanced against each other in order to determine if the
defendant's forfeiture of his or her right to raise the issue on appeal will be
binding.
The two-step approach outlined above conforms with both the underlying
theoretical rationale of the finality rule and the practical reasons for imple-
menting that rule. The theoretical basis for the finality rule arises out of the
very essence of the adversary system. The two-step method of defining ex-
ceptions to the rule responds to that theoretical basis with its breakdown of
the adversary system element. The finality rule only applies in a fully-
functioning adversary system. The practical reasons for the finality rule re-
volve around a method for balancing the interest a defendant has in a trial
free from errors against the interest the state has in preventing endless re-
litigation. The closely balanced evidence test answers these concerns. A de-
fendant has no legitimate interest in a new trial if that trial will merely
generate another conviction. The state, in turn, has no legitimate interest in
imprisoning an innocent person.
The two different approaches to defining procedural defaults outlined in
this Article, the conjunctive and disjunctive tests, underscore the difference
in judicial philosophy between those judges who seek justice and fairness by
examining cases on an individual basis and those judges who seek the same
results but think they can be achieved only by the application of carefully
considered general rules. Judges who reverse convictions simply because of
basic and fundamental errors, for example, and who thus apply the disjunc-
tive test, seek to protect the reputation and integrity of the judicial system
by providing defendants with trials free of any serious error. Such
trials, in their minds, produce an image of justice more convincing than that
provided by a consideration of actual guilt or innocence. In addition, these
judges seek to protect possibly innocent criminal defendants by providing
that virtually any error that may have occurred at a trial in which the evi-
dence was closely balanced will justify reversal regardless of the failure to
preserve the error for appeal. Conversely, those judges who implement the
conjunctive test, and who thus conclude that new trials need not be granted
even in the face of very serious unpreserved error if the evidence in the trial
was not closely balanced, also seek to protect the integrity and reputation of
the judicial system. They do so, however, by attempting to eliminate point-
less relitigation and by re-emphasizing the adversary nature of the American
judicial 'system.
The ultimate rationale of the finality rule and the reasons for its im-
plementation cannot be summarized easily. Perhaps all that can be said is
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that the rule rests on a realization that no process can assure ultimate truth.
Procedural rules do not assure legality because they guarantee that ultimate
truth will prevail. Rather, they assure legality because they contribute to a
process whereby the judicial system itself creates a reasoned and acceptable
probability that truth will emerge. 176 They seek to do no more and can do
no more. Thus, to the extent that the finality rule contributes to that overall
process it aids in the establishment of legality. Furthermore, to the extent
that the conjunctive approach to defining exceptions to the finality rule
suggested in this Article clarifies the implemehtation of those exceptions and
reduces arbitrariness in their application, it too contributes a worthwhile
element to the process of establishing truth.
176. Bator, supra note 13, at 450-53.

